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SHORTNESS  OF VISION:  REGULATORY
AMBITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Susan P. Crawford*
INTRODUCTION
Quietly,  in impenetrable  regulatory  language  and carefully  staged  steps,
some  of the  governments  of the  world  have  undertaken  to  constrain  the
open platforms and open devices that make up the network of networks that
is the Internet.  The Internet  has  matured and become  vital to  commercial
life,  they  say,  and  surely  it  is  time  for  someone  to  be  in  charge.1
Meanwhile,  public  concern  about  the  perceived  dangers  of online  life  is
increasing.  There  is spam.  There  is  spyware.  There  is  pornography,  and
we will soon see more convulsive efforts to "protect"  Internet users from its
effects.  Pummelled  with  news  stories  about  the  cesspools  of online  life,
citizens who are not online may become less inclined to go there, and many
of those who  are  merely  sending email  certainly wish that someone would
make  the  spam  go  away.  Meanwhile,  the  content  industry  and  law
enforcement  authorities are both interested in constraining the free flows of
information that have characterized  the Internet so far.  The convergence  of
regulatory ambition  and public  concern is unmistakable.  It could well lead
to  actions that  we will  regret,  as  regulatory agencies  take the  occasion  of
*  Assistant Professor, Cardozo  School  of Law.  Many  thanks  to Yochai  Benkler, Michael
Herz, David Johnson, Pam Samuelson, Kevin  Stack, Stewart Sterk, and Tim Wu.  An earlier
version of this paper was discussed during  the 2004 cyberprof retreat hosted by the Berkman
Center for Internet  and Society at  Harvard Law  School.  Special thanks  to Brianne Biggiani,
Joshua Goldstein, and Anthony diFrancesca, who provided research assistance.
1.  Interview  with  Markus  Kummer,  Head Secretariat  of the  United  Nations  Working
Group  on  Internet  Governance,  Int'l  Telecomm.  Union,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/interview  with  united  nations-head-secretariatofwgig/
(last visited Oct. 23,  2005).
It is a positive  sign that countries  are discussing  how  to run the  Internet, since  it
requires  global  solutions  to  its  problems....  Governments  now  feel  that  the
Internet has become  so important that it should be regarded as a matter of national
interest.  And so they see the need for getting  involved....  The  governments  who
want to play a more active role also see a need for closer international  cooperation.
They feel that  the United  Nations  is the natural  system of global  governance  and
they hold the view that  a United Nations umbrella would  be a prerequisite to give
the necessary political legitimacy to Internet governance.
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public  fear  to  assert  greater-but  ultimately  counterproductive--control
over online applications  and devices.
This  global  regulatory  trend  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  process  of
"Internet  governance."  My goal  in this Article  is  to persuade  you that we
face a great choice  in the current Internet governance  debate between open
platforms,  open  devices,  and  diversity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  constrained
platforms,  constrained  devices, and monocultures,  on the other.  This  is an
important  choice  because  of its  implications  for  the value,  richness,  and
vibrancy  of  all  human  communications.  We  should  not  take  the
evolutionary  risky  choice  of imposing  centrally  controlled boundaries  (or
membranes)  regulating flows of bits2-information-online.  Moreover, if
the  proponents  of  centralized  control  are  allowed  to  proceed,  they  will
waste  an enormous  amount of energy  working towards failure.  While  they
may  initially be emboldened  to claim victory when their large-scale  moves
change  the  online  landscape,  over  time  the  complexity  of the  Internet's
information flows will defeat the forces of centralization.  In the meantime,
major opportunities  for innovation,  decentralized "regulation,"  and creative
social and economic engagement will have been foreclosed.
Part  I  provides  an  analytical  framework  for  the  upcoming  national
conversation  about governance  of online information flows.  The Internet is
itself  a  complex  adaptive  system,  made  up  of many  interacting  agents
(including  many  non-state  communities)  whose  dynamic  engagements
produce  elaborate,  decentralized,  permeable  membranes  regulating
information  flow. 3  Think  of  the  Internet  as  an  environment  in  which
government  is  attempting  to  operate,  like  the  terrain  on which  a battle  is
played out.  Where the complexity of a system (government)  is insufficient
to  cope  with the  complexity  of its  environment  (the  Internet),  the  system
will  be  unsuccessful.  Although  large-scale  operations  can  defeat
complexity when the large-scale  system  is able to operate (in the same way
that a platoon of tanks  can roll  over  a forest),  if the  large-scale  system  is
2.  By  "bits,"  I  mean  machine-readable  representations  of  information.  "Bit"  is
shorthand for "binary digit," the smallest unit of information  on a machine.  A single bit can
exemplify  only  one  of two  values:  0  or  1. More  significant  information  is  obtained  by
combining  consecutive  bits  into  larger units-such  as  bytes,  which  are  made up  of eight
consecutive bits.  Netdictionary,  http://www.netdictionary.com/b.html  (last visited  Oct. 23,
2005).
3.  Other  examples  of complex  systems  are  "[t]he  economy,  the  stock  market,  the
weather,  ant  colonies,  earthquakes,  traffic  jams,  living  organisms,  ecosystems,  turbulence,
epidemics,  the immune  system, river networks,  land-slides,  zebra stripes, sea-shell patterns,
and  heartbeats."  Ben  Moore,  Inst.  for  Theoretical  Physics,  Univ.  of  Zurich,  Complex
Systems,  http://krone.physik.unizh.ch/-moore/complex/complexity.html  (last  visited  Oct.
23,  2005)  (defining  complexity).  Interactions  among  the  agents  that make  up  a  complex
system  lead to emergent properties of the system (properties  that could not be explained by
traditional  analysis)  that are  not properties  of the  agents  themselves.  Complex  networks
have  self-similar  (fractal)  properties,  meaning that they  consist of self-repeating  patterns  at
all scales.  Erica Klarreich,  Sizing Up Complex  Webs:  Close or Far,  Many Networks Look
the  Same,  Science  News  Online,  Jan.  29,  2005,
http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20050129/fob3.asp  (reporting  results  from  Chaoming
Song  et al.,  Self-Similarity of Complex Networks, 433 Nature 392 (2005)).
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concerned about the fate of the complex structures  it  seeks to  flatten, it will
be  unable  to  engage.  There  are  many  positive  benefits  of the  Internet's
complex information  flows that governments will want to retain.  Grappling
with this complexity  will ultimately make  it impossible  for governments to
"govern the net."
Part  II  provides the  domestic  legal  background  for this battle.  To date,
the  U.S.  Congress  has  acted  with  great  self-restraint  in  "regulating  the
Internet,"  with  some  exceptions.  It  has  shielded  platform providers  from
liability  for  the  information  flows  they  do  not  create,  and  has  adopted
relatively  lightweight  "notice  and  takedown"  regimes  for  copyrighted
materials  inadvertently  hosted  or  stored  by  platforms.  It  has  refused  to
engage  in  special  taxation  systems  for online  commerce,  and has  (so  far)
not adopted special Internet data privacy laws.  More recently, its obsession
with  sinful  activities  has  led  it  to  take  aggressive  (and  aberrational)
approaches  to  Internet  gambling  and  "harmful  to minors"  online  content.
These  incongruous steps have gotten  Congress in trouble both globally and
in the  U.S.  courts.  In 2005,  congressional  self-restraint  is under  pressure,
and  this Article  is an  attempt to  remind Congress  of the  correctness  of its
initial  approach-and  to  strengthen  congressional  will  to  fend  off  the
strident  demands  of law enforcement  and the content  industry for Internet
regulation.
Two U.S. domestic case studies, both having to do with the powers of the
Federal  Communications  Commission  ("FCC"  or  "Commission"),
demonstrate that agency's tendency  to assume that a top-down engineering
approach  can  "fix"  online  problems.  The  first,  the  broadcast  flag
rulemaking,  focused  on  the  interfaces  between  machines  that manipulate
digital  content  and  the  Internet.4  The  second,  the  IP-enabled  services
rulemaking,5  concerns  applications  and  services  that  use  the  Internet
Protocol  ("IP"). 6  These  two  fascinating  proceedings  have  largely  gone
unnoticed  by  the  mainstream  press,  but are  enormously  important  to  the
future of the Internet.  They represent the first organized effort to "regulate
the  Internet"  by creating  centrally  planned barriers  to  particular  kinds  of
bits.  Both  of these  proceedings  have  as  their  key  goal  the  creation  of
mandated  membranes  (or boundaries)  for information  flows, by  affecting
what machines  can send  out online and what online applications  can work
on or provide.  These  proceedings  ignore  the possibility  of any  non-state
sources  of membranes-much  less  the  idea  that  such  membranes  could
evolve  to  shelter  complex  organisms  of social  order.  They  also  conflict
with  the  FCC's  overall  deregulationist  approach  to  online  issues  and  are
4.  Digital  Broad.  Content  Prot,  18  F.C.C.R.  23,550  (2003)  (FCC  report,  order,  and
further notice of proposed rule).
5.  IP-Enabled  Services,  19  F.C.C.R.  4863  (2004)  (FCC  notice  of  proposed
rulemaking).
6.  The Internet  Protocol  ("IP") is  "[t]he  protocol  used to  route a  data packet  from its
source  to  its  destination  via  the  Internet."  Red  Hat  Glossary,
http://www.redhat.com/docs/glossary/  (last visited Sept.  15, 2005).
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likely  outside  the  scope  of the  FCC's  delegated  powers.  Thus,  we  will
inevitably end up discussing these matters on Capitol Hill.
Part III tells  the technical  and  political stories  of these two rulemakings,
and ties  these  proceedings to other world events that  fall within  the  larger
Internet governance category.
Part  IV  analyzes  the  legal  tools  that  are  available  to  understand  and
address  this  moment in the Internet's history,  including available  domestic
constraints  on the FCC's power.  Congress  has not given the FCC explicit
statutory  authority to act in either the broadcast flag  or IP-enabled services
situations.  The  FCC  is  relying  on  common-law  "ancillary"  jurisdiction,
stemming  from Title  I of the Telecommunications  Act,7 as the source of its
powers.  In making rules that are legally binding on the public,  however, an
agency  must be able  to  draw a  line from  its powers  to  some provision  of
enacted  law. 8  No  provision  of existing  law  expressly  supports  (or  even
signals  support  for)  the FCC's actions  here,  and Congress would not have
delegated such economically  important powers lightly.9  Moreover, existing
case  law  establishes  that the FCC's ancillary  jurisdiction  is limited to acts
that  are  necessary  to  ensure  the  achievement  of  the  FCC's  statutory
responsibilities.  Because  there  has  been  no  showing  in  either  of these
settings that such necessity exists, it is likely that a court would find that the
FCC  does  not  have  jurisdiction  to  impose  the  "social  policy"  rules
stemming  from the IP Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-just as  a court has
already  found  that  the  FCC  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to  impose  the
broadcast  flag rule.  Thus,  we will need  a national  legislative conversation
about the approach to the Internet embodied in these two rulemakings.
Part  V  then  suggests  an  alternative  outlet  for  governments'  desires  to
constrain information  flows.  Governments  will not be content with simply
leaving  information  flows  alone.  Once  we  understand  the  importance  of
membranes  and  the  impossibility  of  designing  them  in  advance,
governments'  direction should  be clear:  They should  act to encourage  the
evolution of decentralized  feedback loops and membranes that can better do
the job.  Decentralization  of choices about what  is "good" (and, thus, what
membranes  for  information  flows  are  best)  will  lead,  over  time,  to
emergence  of a  clear  path  towards  governance:  evolution  of  complex
organisms  that  will  provide  a  constantly  evolving,  lively,  and  dynamic
social order.
Who  should  be  in  charge  online  has  become  an  extremely  important
cultural,  social,  and  intellectual  question.  At  this  turning  point  in  the
7.  Telecommunications  Act of 1996,  Pub.  L.  No.  104-104,  110  Stat.  56  (codified  as
amended  at 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5c and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
8.  Thomas  W.  Merrill,  Rethinking  Article I,  Section  1:  From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2100-01  (2004) (discussing the importance
of exclusive  delegation  understanding  rather than  nondelegation;  agencies  and  courts have
no inherent authority to make law (at least with respect to the matters  covered by Article  I),
but Congress may transfer  such authority to them) ("Article  I, Section  1 tells us not that only
Congress can legislate, but only Congress can delegate.").
9.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.  120,  159 (2000).
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development  of  the  Internet,  the  need  for  longer-term  and  humbler
collective vision is acute.  We need to recognize that Internet governance  is
really  about  regulating  information  flows,  that  all  we  can  hope  to  do
globally is to encourage adequate evolution, and that finding someone to be
the external pilot is both an impossible and dangerous task.  In the absence
of the  long  view,  the  world  will  suffer from  the  regulatory  ambitions  of
central  planners  whose  efforts  are doomed  to  fail.  We  may  never  know
what  we  have lost.  The U.S.  Congress  should be  encouraged  to  lead  the
world  towards  self-restraint,  both  because  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do  and
because  this  approach  will  avoid expensively  unsuccessful  attempts  to  do
otherwise.
I.  PRINCIPLES OF NONREGULATION FOR THE INTERNET
Before  taking  on  the  question  of  membranes  for  information  flows
online,  it is  appropriate  to  review  how  the  Internet differs  from  any  other
communications  medium society  has  used  to  date.  This will  help  ground
the discussion of membranes and complex systems that follows.
The story of the Internet-and  its exceptionalism-has  often been told.'0
I set forth here only the briefest of summaries.
A.  What Is the Internet?
The Internet is not a thing.  It is an agreement to allow bits to flow among
machines using a particular language,  or protocol."  It is often thought of in
terms  of its  layers-from  bottom to  top:  (1) physical/infrastructure  layer
(cable,  satellite,  DSL,  WiFi),  (2)  logical  layer  (TCP/IP,  HTTP),  (3)
applications  layer  (browsers,  email,  Voice  over  IP  ("VolP")),  and  (4)
content  layer (speech,  text, music). 12  The  third and fourth layers are  really
not global layers at all.  Instead, they are layers deployed by individuals and
enterprises  to make  use of the  lower  layers.  The  first two  layers  separate
transport  (sending  bits  down  a  connection)  from  the  protocol,  such  as
TCP/IP,  that  chunks  these  bits  into  packets  and  allows  them  to  be
reassembled at the other end. 13
10.  For fine examples  of writing about the architecture  of the Internet  and  its interplay
with  law,  see  Lawrence  B.  Solum  &  Minn  Chung,  The  Layers  Principle:  Internet
Architecture and the  Law,  79  Notre  Dame  L.  Rev.  815  (2004);  A.  Michael  Froomkin,
Habernas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116  Harv. L.  Rev.
749 (2003);  Mark  A. Lemley  & Lawrence  Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving  the
Architecture of  the Internet in the Broadband  Era,  48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 (2001).
11.  William  Gibson describes  cyberspace  as  an  immersive "consensual  hallucination."
William Gibson, Neuromancer 5 (1984).
12.  Arguably, yet another layer is now evolving that facilitates the formation of complex
social  groups  based on  exchanges  of bits  and  effective  use of the  metainformation  that  is
generated  by  these exchanges.  The  emergence  of this  new  "social  protocol"  layer  of the
Internet  suggests that we  will collectively build  a better  society,  not just a better Internet,  if
we build systems  and  laws  that let that society  evolve  online.  That layer is the  subject  for
another article.
13.  See  Webopedia  Definition  of  TCP/IP,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/TCP.htm  (last visited Sept.  12,  2005).
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The  layers  nondiscrimination  principle  dictates  that  all  forms  of the
physical/infrastructure  layer  can  or  will  permit  the  logical  layer  to  run
across  them.  Thus,  fiber-optic  infrastructure  or wireless  connections  will
permit  TCP/IP  to  work.  In  turn,  the  logical  layer,  which  contains  the
protocols that divide up packets and reconstruct them into messages  or web
pages,  is  not  (in  principle)  supposed  to  discriminate  against  particular
applications  that  use  that  logical  layer.  And  applications  are  not  (in
principle) supposed to discriminate  against particular forms of content. 14
Implementation  of the  layers  principle  (e.g.,  not allowing  the  transport
layer to discriminate  against any of the three levels above) permits the end-
to-end principle  first articulated  in  an  important  paper  by Jerome  Saltzer,
David  Reed,  and  David  Clark  in  1984  to  flourish. 15  The  end-to-end
principle  suggests  that  communications-information-ideally  should  not
be filtered or changed or operated  on by the network itself, but only by the
edges,  at  the  level  of  client  applications  that  individuals  set  up  and
manipulate. 1 6 This end-to-end principle, like the layers principle, keeps bits
flowing freely  across the lower levels of the protocol stack, to be processed
only when they get much closer to the end user-the edge of the network. 17
The  miraculous  growth of the Internet  has  in  large  part  come  from  the
nondiscrimination  against  higher  levels  that  is  part  of  the  lower  layers'
architecture. 18  Innovators  at the application  layer have been able  to assume
14.  The  layers  concept  has  recently  become  a  suggested  model  for  regulatory
intervention.  In  early  2004,  MCI  issued  a  paper  suggesting  that  cable  and  telephone
providers be required to make their networks  available to others on  a wholesale  basis, citing
(and  relying  on)  the  layers  principle.  Richard  S.  Whitt,  Codifying  the  Network  Layers
Model:  MCI's Proposal  for New Federal Legislation Reforming U.S. Communications Law
(2004) (MCI Public Policy Paper).
15.  Jerome  H.  Saltzer,  David  P.  Reed  &  David  D.  Clark,  End-to-End Arguments  in
System Design,  2 ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 277 (1984).
16.  See also David  Isenberg,  Rise of the Stupid Network, Computer  Telephony,  Aug.
1997, available  at http://www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html.
17.  The openness  of the  Internet  (rough nondiscrimination  between  layers,  intelligence
at the edges)  stands  in contrast to telephone networks,  which use circuit switching.  When a
telephone  call  is  made  from one  person to  another,  a dedicated  connection  is opened  and
sustained for  the duration of the call.  Because  that connection  goes in both directions,  it is
called a circuit.  A call is routed via a local  carrier through a switch to reach  the person you
are calling.  Use of circuit switching therefore relies on intelligence-routing  and processing
decisions being made-residing at the center of the network.  Indeed,  a fundamental  goal of
telephony  switches is to maintain control over circuits.  See Susan P. Crawford,  Someone to
Watch over Me:  Social Policies for the Internet (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(describing  history of telephony).  Data networks  such as  the Internet  use packet-switching
rather  than  circuit  switching.  There  is no  constant,  open  connection  in  a packet  switched
network.  Instead,  the  sending  computer  divides  data  into  packets,  puts  addressing
information on each one, and opens  a connection just long  enough to send  each packet one
hop.  The  packets  follow  whatever route  seems most  efficient at  the  time  (which may  be
different  for each  packet)  and are reassembled  by the receiving  computer.  Where  a central
telephone provider must provide enhanced  functionalities at a physical  termination point, IP
network  design  is  flat and  highly decentralized,  allowing substantial  innovation  to occur  at
the edges of  the network.  Id.
18.  See Isenberg, supra note 16; see also ISOC:  The Internet  Society and Public Policy,
http://www.isoc.org/news/3.shtml  (last visited Oct. 23,  2005)  ("The  explosive growth of the
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the  continued  stable  existence  of the  lower  layers,  and  have  not  had  to
provide  for either  transport  or  logical  protocols  in  order  to  spread  their
applications. 
19
B.  Why Are Membranes Important to the Internet?
The  open  standards  and  nondiscriminatory  layers  of the  Internet  have
prompted  much more than  mere innovation.  The Internet  has given rise to
an  explosive  growth  in  information  flows,  prompting  the  emergence  of a
richly varied,  closely connected,  and  highly structured  social,  cultural, and
intellectual  online world.  More  than 900 million people  are now online. 20
The world has become much smaller  as  a result of the Internet's growth; it
is clear, for example,  that the December  2004 tsunami relief response was
spurred  by  Internet  communications.21  Blogs  have  replaced  mainstream
media  as  sources  of  news  for  many  people.22  Podcasting  may  replace
radio.23  These  flows are not just one-to-many,  however.  Increasingly,  we
are seeing the emergence of a social layer of the protocol stack that involves
group  interactions  of all  kinds:  one-many-few  to  one-many-few.24  What
makes this online structuring possible is the existence of membranes.
What  is a "membrane"?  For biological  cells, of course,  the membranes
that surround them are vital.  They define the cell  and determine what it can
and cannot do.  Membranes  were  the first structures  of living organisms to
Internet  and the incredible variety of Internet applications  are  a direct result of the fact that
the key standards  for the Internet  and the Web  are open.").
19.  See ISOC:  The Internet  Society and Public Policy, supra  note  18.
20.  ClickZ  Stats  Web  Worldwide,  Trends  &  Statistics:  The  Web's  Richest  Source,
http://www.clickz.com/stats/webworldwide/  (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
21.  As David Ho reported,
Rapidly  changing  estimates on the  amount raised  for victims  of the Southeast
Asian earthquake  and tsunami vary greatly, but there is consensus that at least half
of the hundreds of millions  in private  donations  arrived through the Internet.  The
American  Red  Cross  has  raised  more  than  $168  million  with  more  than  $71
million coming through  its Web  site, according  to The Chronicle of Philanthropy.
Of the  $35  million  received  by  the  U.S.  Fund  for UNICEF  in  New  York,  $25
million is  in Internet donations.
David  Ho, Record Online Tsunami Relief Changes Ways of Giving, The Fin. Express, Jan.
17,  2005,  http://www.financialexpress.com/fefull-story.php?contentid=79947?headline=
Record-online-tsunami-relief-changesways-of-giving.
22.  Lee  Rainie,  Pew  Internet &  American  Life Project,  The  State  of Blogging  (2005),
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP-bloggingdata.pdf  (finding  that  blog  readership  was
up fifty-eight percent  in 2004, that six  million Americans  get news  and information  fed to
them  through  Rich  Site  Summary  ("RSS")  aggregators,  but  that  sixty-two  percent  of
Americans were unsure, however, of what a "blog" was).
23.  Daniel  Terdiman, Podcasts: New  Twists on Net Audio, Wired News,  Oct. 8,  2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,65237,00.html.
24.  Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy  of Groups 3-4 (2005)  (unpublished manuscript,
on  file  with  the  author)  ("[T]echnology  is  revolutionizing  our  capacity  for  purposive
collective  action with geographically  remote  actors....  This evolution  toward  technology
for  groups  is  evident  from  Meetups,  Wikis,  LiveJournal,  peer-to-peer,  groupware,  virtual
worlds, GRID  computing,  [and]  a wide  range of so-called  "social  software" tools,  such  as
Friendster  or Wallop.").
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evolve,25 and  their basic  function is to separate the  inside from outside-to
separate  the chemicals  and structures  needed  to maintain  the  cell  from the
outside  environment.  Membranes  regulate in both directions, filtering what
comes in  and what goes out.  The properties of cell  membranes  arise  from
the  physical  behavior  of  various  lipids  (water-insoluble  substances).
Bacteria  can  be  destroyed  by  antibiotics  punching  holes  in  their  cell
membranes,  making  them  porous  and  leaky.26   All  membranes  are
permeable, but you can have too much of a good thing.  Some membranes
also have  a  homeostatic  function in  that  they protect  what  is  inside  from
rapid  change;  not  from all  change,  which  would be  deadly,  but  from too
much change too quickly.27
There  have always  been membranes for information  flows,  and we have
always  created them in decentralized  ways.  Every  time an individual  or a
group  decides not to listen to some  outside source of information, allows  a
new member in, or reads something suggested by a colleague, he/it is using
(and participating  in  constructing)  a permeable  membrane.  For  cells  and
other  living things, permeable membranes  are nutrient collection and drop-
off areas;  for minds,  permeable  membranes  are information  collection and
rejection  areas  that  help  us  select  the  right  data  from  the  constant  and
overwhelming  flows  surrounding  us.  Informational  membranes  are
everywhere,  and  no  one  has  to  tell  us  how  to  create  them  or what  their
characteristics  are.  There is no one "in  charge" of this structure.
How  do  permeable  informational  membranes  operate  online?  The
swapping of information is a simple interaction, but it requires copying onto
some  substrate  or surface  in order for the information  to  continue  to exist
and replicate and (eventually)  evolve.  For a bit, the best way to travel is to
be replicated  or to  be sent,  as  a copy,  somewhere.  So membranes  for bits
are predominately  established by the  availability of mechanisms  that allow
or frustrate the ability to make or send copies.  Many online membranes  are
very simple:  who is allowed to be a member of a particular listserv, how do
you  leave  a  particular  provider  of  online  services,  what  content  is
appropriate  for  what  online  site,  what  community  of blogs  links  to  one
another,  and  more.  Increasingly,  online  information  is  subject  to  the
membrane  of attention.  Some people  (or some  groups) pay attention  to  a
particular kind of information  flow (and in so doing are directing whatever
membrane  they  have  adopted  to  take  in-be  permeable  to-this
information).  We  are  remarkably  selective  about  what  we  will  take  on
board and what we will not.
The  growth  of the  Internet,  through  the  networked,  interactive  screens
that  make  it  human-readable,  has  facilitated  a  wild  proliferation  of
25.  McGraw-Hill  Online  Learning  Center,  The  Importance  of  Membranes,
http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0073031216/student  view0/exercise9/the_
importance  of membranes.html (last visited Sept. 10,  2005).
26.  Lukas  Buehler,  What Is Life,  http://www.whatislife.com/education/fact/history.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
27.  See  Definition  of  Homeostasis,  WordReference.com  Dictionary,
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/homeostasis  (last visited Oct. 23,  2005).
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interestingly  permeable  membranes.  These  membranes,  in  turn,  have
facilitated  a wild proliferation of varied information flows.  The conceptual
and  code-based  rules  that  surround  these  communities  act  as  two-way
membranes,  permitting  and prohibiting the flow of bits.  These membranes
are  legal  code  in  the  Lawrence  Lessig  sense,28  but  to  describe  them  as
"law"  would miss most of their important features.  They are also the means
by  which  individuals  and  groups  govern  dialogue,  communication,  flux,
and flow.  What we pay attention to defines who we are.
Government  has not previously attempted to regulate who we  are by way
of  mandated  information  flow  membranes,  or  at  least  not  successfully.
Governments make  disclosure rules that require the display of information,
like  nutritional  labeling,  credit  disclosures,  and  product  safety  statements.
But these  are  very  different  from  mandated  creation  of membranes  (e.g.,
"this  kind of information  may not pass through  this kind of barrier.")  We
have  rarely  allowed  governments  to  establish  or  control  informational
membranes. 29  Nor  have  we  ever  had  to  be  explicit  about  the  source  of
informational  membranes,  because  it  was  self-evident  that  offline
information  flows were  matters  of nongovernmental  decision.  Membranes
are  fundamental,  emergent  entities,  existing  only  as  a  property  of  the
collective  organism  that  created them.  Centralized  attempts  to  change  or
ban  particular  informational  membranes,  such  as  mandating  the  use  of
official  languages, 30 or requiring that particular words not be used,31 feel  to
28.  See generally, Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace  (1999).
29.  Obscenity  and child pornography,  of course,  are exceptions  to this  rule.  But child
pornography  laws are arguably focused on avoiding  abuse of children rather than prohibiting
communication  of information  that  appears to depict children engaged in sexual  activities-
behavior,  rather than communication,  is the true  target of these laws.  See Ashcroft  v. Free
Speech  Coal.,  535  U.S.  234  (2002)  (holding  unconstitutional  a  ban  on  virtual  child
pornography).  Federal  Communications  Commission  ("FCC")  rules  regulating  "indecent"
and "profane"  broadcast  content  (by  limiting such  content to  broadcast between  10:00  pm
and 6:00 am), 47  C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004); see  18 U.S.C.  § 1464 (2000),  seem increasingly
anachronistic.  As  Professor Michael  Dorf of Columbia said not long ago,  "Was  the  [Janet
Jackson] halftime show unsuitable for the millions of small children watching?  Sure.  But so
are half the  shows  on  prime-time  television."  Michael  Dorf, Does the First Amendment
Protect  Janet  Jackson  and  Justin  Timberlake,  CNN.com,  Feb.  4,  2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/04/findlaw.analysis.dorf.jackson.indecency/.  Nearly
100  percent of the  indecency  complaints sent to  the  FCC  in 2003  stemmed  from  a  single
advocacy group--the  Parents Television  Group.  Todd  Shields, Activists Dominate Content
Complaints,  MediaWeek.com,  Dec.  6,  2004,
http://www.mediaweek.com/mediaweek/headlines/articledisplay.jsp?vnucontent  id=1000
731656.  In  Reno  v.  ACLU,  521  U.S.  844  (1997),  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  an
indecency  standard  for  the  Internet.  Rules  restricting  online  gambling  also  appear  to  be
anachronistic  at this point.
30.  See generally James  Crawford, Hold Your Tongue:  Bilingualism  and the Politics of
'English  Only'  (1992).
31.  "As  French  culture  [and  language  have]  come  under  increasing  pressure  with  the
widespread availability  of English  media, the Acaddmie  [Fran~aise]  has tried to prevent the
anglicisation  of  the  French  language."  Wikipedia,  Acadamie  Franqaise,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French  academy  (last visited  Oct.  23,  2005).  It  is  as  a  direct
result of a decision of the Acaddmie that the French word for "computer"  is "ordinateur"  and
that the  field  of study  dealing  with  computers  is  known  as  "informatique"  (informatics),
from the contraction of "information"  and "automatique."  Id.; see also David G.  Post,  "The
2005]FORDHAM  LA W REVIEW
us  like  thought  control.  Individuals  are  likely  to  reject  such  centralized
filtering attempts.
Governments  can,  of  course,  act  on  atoms.  Governments  create
enforceable barriers  and borders  and speed limits that affect behavior.  We
will  respond  to  force  when  it  is  used  to compel  us to  modify  our  actions,
and  we  have  entire  systems  of criminal  justice  that  are  based  on  this
premise.  But shaping a road barrier, mandating a speed limit, or requiring a
nutritional  disclaimer  are  all governmental  acts  that  are  entirely  different
from  requiring  that  boundaries  to  information  flows  be  erected  and
maintained.
II.  CONGRESS AND "REGULATING  THE INTERNET"
The  United  States claims  pride of place  as  the  inventor  of the  Internet,
and  it  is  beyond  question  that  U.S.  government  funding  (and
interoperability  requirements) made the Internet possible.  How has the U.S.
Congress  dealt  with  the  complexities  of  information  flow  membranes
online?
A.  The Hands-Off  Approach
The  clearest  statement  of Congressional  purpose  when  grappling  with
Internet  information  flows  is  found  in  Section  509  of  the
Telecommunications  Act of 1996,  47 U.S.C. § 230:
(a) FINDINGS.  The Congress  finds  the  following:  (1) The  rapidly
developing  array  of  Internet  and  other  interactive  computer  services
available  to  individual  Americans  represent  an extraordinary  advance  in
the  availability  of  educational  and  informational  resources  to  our
citizens....  (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished,  to  the  benefit  of  all  Americans,  with  a  minimum  of
government regulation....
(b) POLICY.  It is the policy of the United States...  (2) to preserve
the  vibrant  and  competitive  free  market  that  presently  exists  for  the
Internet  and other interactive  computer  services, unfettered  by Federal  or
State regulation  ....  32
In this section,  Congress explicitly elected not to impose common carrier
obligations  (regulating  content,  prices,  or access  by others)  on  interactive
computer  services.  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  § 230,  interactive  and
computer  service  providers  faced  fearsome  potential  liability  for  content
created  by  third  parties  because  of  two  key  (and  inconsistent)  court
decisions. 33   Congress  listened  to  the  concerns  of  interactive  service
Free Use of Our Faculties  ":  Thomas Jefferson, Cyberspace, and the Languages of  Social
Life, 49 Drake L. Rev. 407 (2001).
32.  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  Pub.  L.  No.  104-104,  110  Stat.  56,  137-39
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.  § 230 (2000)).
33.  Cubby,  Inc. v. CompuServe,  776  F.  Supp.  135  (S.D.N.Y.  1991);  Stratton Oakmont,
Inc.  v.  Prodigy  Servs.  Co.,  No.  31063/94,  1995  N.Y.  Misc.  LEXIS  229  (N.Y.  Sup.  Ct.
Nassau Cty. May 24,  1995).
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providers  and  enacted  §  230  to  protect  them  from  liability  for  content
created  by others  so  as  to  avoid hampering  online  service  innovation.  As
the  Fourth Circuit  held in  Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 3 4 "[b]y  its plain
language,  § 230  creates  a  federal  immunity  to  any  cause  of action  that
would  make  service  providers  liable  for  information  originating  with  a
third-party  user  of  the  service." 35   Since  its  adoption,  §  230  has  been
construed to  establish almost universal  immunity  for service providers  that
are sued based on content  created by third parties. 36  § 230 was  enacted to
support  the  robust  nature  of  Internet  communication  and  to  keep
government  interference  in  information  flows  to  a  minimum. 37  Illegal
speech  (defamation,  obscenity,  copyright  infringement)  continues  to  be
illegal,  but is  primarily targeted  as  a behavior  of individual  humans rather
than  at  the  membrane  level  through governmental  stemming  of particular
flows of data across platforms or technologies.
Congress has  continued to  legislate  in the  spirit of § 230.  For example,
the Internet Tax Freedom Act
38 has  imposed moratoriums  since  1998  (now
extended to 2007) on state and local taxes on Internet access and multiple or
discriminatory taxes  on e-commerce. 39  The Digital Millennium  Copyright
Act ("DMCA"),40  although  rightfully criticized  for its broad restrictions  on
circumventing  copy  protection  technology,4 1 enshrines  a deal that protects
online service providers from liability for copyright infringement by users if
34.  129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
35.  Id. at 330.
36.  See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co.  v. Am.  Online, Inc., 206  F.3d 980 (10th  Cir. 2000);
Doe v. Franco Prods., No. 96-4095,  2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  8845  (N.D. Il.  June  22, 2000),
aff'd on other grounds, 347 F.3d  655  (7th Cir.  2003); Blumenthal  v.  Drudge,  992  F.  Supp.
44  (D.D.C.  1998);  cf Barrett  v. Rosenthal,  9  Cal. Rptr. 3d  142  (Cal.  Ct. App.)  (ruling by
California  lower  court  that  section  230  immunity  does  not  apply  when  the  individual
republishing  the statements knew or had reason to know of the falsity of the material being
disseminated), petition for review granted and opinion superseded by  87  P.3d  797  (Cal.
2004).
37.  Zeran v. Am. Online,  Inc.,  129  F.3d  327, 333  (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524  U.S.
937 (1998).  As the Zeran court explained,
More generally, notice-based  liability for interactive  computer service providers
would  provide  third  parties  with  a  no-cost  means  to  create  the  basis  for  future
lawsuits.  Whenever  one  was  displeased  with  the  speech  of  another  party
conducted  over  an  interactive computer  service,  the  offended party  could  simply
"notify"  the  relevant  service  provider,  claiming  the  information  to  be  legally
defamatory.  In  light  of  the  vast  amount  of  speech  communicated  through
interactive  computer  services, these  notices  could  produce  an  impossible burden
for  service providers,  who  would be  faced with  ceaseless choices  of suppressing
controversial  speech  or  sustaining  prohibitive  liability.  Because  the  probable
effects  of  distributor  liability  on  the  vigor  of Internet  speech  and  on  service
provider self-regulation are directly contrary  to § 230's statutory purposes,  we will
not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact.
Id.
38.  Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151  note  (2000).
39.  Internet  Tax Nondiscrimination  Act, Pub.  L. No.  108-435,  118 Stat. 2615  (2004) (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609 note).
40.  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  105-304,  112  Stat.  2860  (1998)
(codified in scattered  sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 4001).
41.  See, e.g.,  Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev.  1095  (2003).
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the provider "expeditiously"  removes the infringing material after receiving
notification  from  the  copyright  owner.42  And  Congress  has  to  date  not
adopted a widely applicable  online privacy  law, preferring  instead to take a
sectoral  approach-grappling  with  financial  privacy43   and  health
privacy44 -that  applies to both offline and online data.45
B.  The Intermeddling  Approach
Congressional  and  prosecutorial  efforts  to  regulate  online  information
flows  by mandating  that particular  membranes  or barriers  be  put in place
have  been  met with prolonged  litigation and-mostly-have  not survived
constitutional  scrutiny.  Congressional  obsession  with pornography  led  to
the Communications  Decency Act  ("CDA"), which would  have prohibited
posting  "indecent"  or  "patently  offensive"  materials  in  a  public  forum
online.46  The  CDA  was  declared  unconstitutional  in  a  landmark  U.S.
Supreme  Court  decision  in  1997. 47  The  Child  Online  Protection  Act
("COPA") was then enacted into law  in  1998,48 and would have prohibited
commercial  website  operators  from  offering  material that was  suitable  for
adults but considered "harmful to minors" unless  such sites verified the age
42.  17 U.S.C.  § 512 (2000).
43.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Financial Modernization Act,  15 U.S.C. § 6801  (2000).
44.  Health Insurance  Portability  and Accountability  Act, Pub.  L. No.  104-91,  110 Stat.
1936 (1996)  (codified in scattered  sections of 18,  26, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
45.  Its  one  excursion  into  a  specialized  online  privacy  law,  the  Children's  Online
Privacy Protection Act,  15  U.S.C.A.  § 6503 (2004),  has not been a success; many sites have
elected simply not to provide  interactive  services for children under thirteen rather than cope
with  the  exacting  oversight  and  notice  requirements  of the  Act.  See Carrie  Kirby,  Youth
Privacy Net Law  Takes Effect, Many  Web  Site  Operators Worry  They'll Lose Money  on
Children's  Market,  S.F.  Chron.,  Apr.  21,  2000,  at  BI,  available  at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/04/2  I/BU 102542.DT
L  &type=business);  Ben  Chamy,  The  Cost of COPPA:  Kids' Site Stops  Talking, ZDNet,
Sept.  12,  2000,  http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595  22-523848.html?legacy=zdnn.  A  report
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center also noted that
[c]ritics  have  claimed  that  the  methods  outlined  by  the  [Federal  Trade
Commission  ("FTC")]  for  verification-sending/faxing  signed  printed  forms,
supplement of credit card numbers, calling toll-free numbers,  or forwarding digital
signatures  through  email-are  too  costly,  cumbersome,  and  inadequate  in
protecting  personal  information.  Even  though  new  technologies  are  being
developed,  the  current  verification  methods  are  too  slow  and  impractical.  The
process of verification of mails, emails,  and credit  card numbers  may take over a
day.  Further, disclosure  of credit card information will  expose the  parents to the
same privacy risks that they are  trying to protect their children from and deter them
from  using  such  online  services  in  general.  As  a  consequence,  children  may
manipulate  information  to  access  these  websites,  and  in  the  long  run,  online
businesses  may ...  eliminate children-focused sites.
Electronic  Privacy  Information  Center,  The  Children's  Online  Privacy  Protection  Act
(COPPA), http://www.epic.org/privacy/kids/  (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
46.  Communications  Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
47.  Reno v. ACLU, 521  U.S.  844 (1997).
48.  Pub. L. No.  105-277,  112 Stat. 2681  (1998)  (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.  § 231
(2000)).
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of all  visitors.  After several  years of litigation, the  Supreme Court in June
2004 enjoined the enforcement of COPA.
4 9
The next information-flow  membrane  mandate  to pass Congress-again,
prompted  by  legislators'  fixation  on  indecent (but  legal)  content  online-
was  the  Children's  Internet  Protection  Act  ("CIPA"),50  which  required
libraries  to  install  filtering  software  on  all  their  computers  capable  of
accessing the Internet in order to hold on to their federal funding.  The goal
of this  2000  legislation  was  to  condition  provision  of  such  funding  on
libraries'  use of filters that block access to visual depictions that are harmful
to  minors  (when  accessed  by  a minor).  On  June  23,  2003,  after  another
three years of litigation, the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, with two "swing"
Justices  (Anthony  Kennedy  and  Stephen  Breyer)  suggesting  that  adults
would  be  able  to  ask  librarians  to  unblock  legal  sites  (legal  for  adult
viewing,  if harmful  to  minors)  that  had  been  blocked  by  the  installed
filters.5'  Even  though  the  tie  to  the  CDA  was  clear-this  was  another
congressional  attempt  to  eliminate online  sexual material  using technology
that would  also  inevitably  filter out  protected  speech-the  link to  federal
funding made  this case one the Justices  could decide differently. 52  Indeed,
the  federal  funding  element may have been the crucial  difference  between
CDA and CIPA.  One European commentator noted the CIPA opinion as an
"important  shift"  by an  American  legal  system  that had  been "previously
critical of government's attempts to regulate Internet access." 53
Not  only  has  Congress  drawn  an  enormous  amount  of litigious  energy
with  its  aberrational  attempts  to  pass  categorical  laws  about  information
flows  online, the  global trade  reputation  of the United  States is also being
affected. Recently,  the World Trade  Organization ("WTO")  has challenged
U.S. decisions  to declare  online gambling  by U.S. citizens illegal,  claiming
that  these  restrictions  violate  trade  promises  that  the  United  States  has
made.54  The  United States interprets  the  1961  amendments  to  18 U.S.C.  §
49.  The  Court sent  the  case  back  down  for  a trial  to evaluate  whether technology  had
changed in the intervening five years since the law was first declared unconstitutional  by the
Third Circuit. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 540 U.S.  1072 (2003).
50.  Pub. L. No.  106-554,  114 Stat. 2763  (2000) (to be  codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7001).
51.  United  States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S.  194 (2003).
52.  Justice  William  Rehnquist,  writing for the  majority,  noted that "Congress  has  wide
latitude  to  attach conditions to the  receipt of federal assistance in order to  further its policy
objectives....  We  have  held  in  two  analogous  contexts  that  the  Government  has  broad
discretion  to  make  content-based  judgments  in  deciding  what  private  speech  to  make
available  to the public,"  and stated that categorical content  controls were appropriate  in the
dynamic  context of  the Internet. Id. at 203-04.
53.  Marcus  Alexander,  Filtering  the  Public  Forum,  CMLP  Self  Regulation  Review
(June/July  2003), http://www.selfregulation.info/iapcoda/0307xx-selfregulation-review.htm.
54.  See James D. Thayer, The  Trade of Cross-Border  Gambling and Betting:  The  WTO
Dispute Between  Antigua  and the  United States, 2004  Duke  L.  &  Tech.  Rev.  0013,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0013.html;  House  of  Cards;  The
WTO  and  Online  Gambling,  The  Economist,  Nov.  18,  2004,  at  28,  available  at
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3411641;  The  Associated
Press,  WTO:  US. Should Drop Online Gambling  Ban, newsfactor.com, November  11,  2004,
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?storyid=28343.
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1084, 55  written  to  address  betting  on  sports  over  the  telephone,  to  cover
online  gambling, and some site operators in the U.S.  have been prosecuted
under this interpretation.  Antigua had argued to the WTO that the U.S. was
providing  half  of  the  world's  customers  for  online  gambling  services,
despite  the illegality  of this  activity  under United  States law.  At  the same
time,  Antigua had "sought  to provide gambling and betting services to the
United  States,"  but  the  U.S.  had  condemned  such  services  as  illegal.56
Under an exception to the WTO's  General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), members  are permitted to adopt measures that are "necessary  to
protect  public  morals"  even  if  they  do  not  meet  "market  access"  or
"national  treatment"  standards  of GATS,  and  the  U.S.  has  argued that  its
position with  respect  to  gambling  fits  within this exception. 57  So far, the
WTO  has dismissed this "public  morals"  argument, perhaps because online
gambling is so easily available  in the U.S.
More  recently,  the  U.S.  effort  to  regulate  email  information  flows
through  requiring  accurate  header  information  in  emails  and  opt-out
procedures has met with ridicule around the world.58  The U.S.  is not alone
in this legislative  failure.  Most  legislative measures-in  the United  States,
Europe, and Australia-have  had little impact on the spain problem.59
55.  Pub. L. No. 87-216,  75 Stat. 491  (codified at 18  U.S.C. § 1084).
56.  Thayer,  supra note  54,  at  2  (citing  First  Written  Submission  of Antigua  and
Barbuda,  United  States-Measures Affecting  the  Cross-Border Supply  of Gambling and
Betting Services,  WT/DS285  (Oct.  1, 2003));  see  also  BBC,  WTO  Rules  Against  U.S.
Gambling  Ban,  Nov.  11,  2004,  available  at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/4001793.stm.
57.  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services,  Apr.  15,  1994,  Marrakesh  Agreement
Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organization,  Annex  IB,  Legal Instruments-Results  of the
Uruguay  Round,  33  I.L.M.  1225,  1168  (1994).  The  U.S.  Trade  Representative,  Robert
Zoellick, has  said about  this  exception,  "If this isn't an exception  that they  should meet,  I
don't know what is."  Thayer, supra note 54, at 8 (quoting  WTO Gambling Decision "deeply
flawed", Reuters, March 25, 2004).
58.  Controlling  the  Assault of Non-Solicited  Pornography  and  Marketing  Act of 2003
("CAN-SPAM"),  Pub. L. No.  108-87,  117 Stat. 2699 (to be codified at 15  U.S.C. §§ 7701-13
and 18  U.S.C.  § 1037); see Tom Zeller, Jr., Law Barring  Junk EmailAllows a Flood  Instead,
N.Y.  Times,  Feb.  1, 2005 at Al  ("A  year after a  sweeping federal  antispam  law  went into
effect,  there  is  more junk  e-mail  on  the  Internet  than  ever....  A  survey  from  Stanford
University  in  December  showed  that  a  typical  Internet user now  spends  about  10 working
days a year dealing with incoming spam.").  In a January  2004 press release,  Spamhaus also
noted that
[a]gainst  the  advice  of  all  anti-spain  organizations,  the  U.S.  House  of
Representatives  has passed the CAN-SPAM  Act, a bill backed  overwhelmingly by
spammers and dubbed the "YOU-CAN-SPAM"  Act because it legalizes spamming
instead of banning  it  ....  From December 11,  spamming will be  illegal in the UK,
but with  90%  of the  UK's  spain problem originating  in the United  States,  British
users will continue to be flooded, now with 'legal'  spain from the U.S.
Press Release,  Spamhaus, United  States Set to Legalize Spanming on January  1, 2004 (Nov.
22, 2003), http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=150.
59.  Postini,  Inc.,  Annual  Report  (2005),
http://www.postini.com/whitepapers/?WPID=25.  This  report noted that even  as  attention to
the cost and prevention of spain reached a high point  in 2004, threats to email systems grew
worse  as the  incidence  of spain  remained  at  seventy-five  to  eighty percent  of email,  virus
attacks grew threefold, and directory  harvest attacks  ("DHA") continued to plague corporate
email  servers. See generally id.  For  a discussion  of how peer  governance could  fix spam,
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These examples  of U.S.  efforts  to regulate online  information  flows and
membranes  are  only  illustrative;  an  exhaustive  treatment  of this  subject is
beyond the  scope of this  Article.  My  argument is this:  Congress  took the
right approach,  the approach  supporting  the further  growth of the  Internet,
in § 230 and in the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") liability sections of the
DMCA.  When, more recently,  its absorption with pornography has led it to
attempt  to  lock  down  information  flows  online,  it  has  faced  enormous
litigation  burdens  (CDA,  COPA, CIPA)  and has  achieved  little  success-
either  because  the  laws  have  been  struck  down  as  unconstitutional  or
because  they  have  had  little impact  on the  ground.  More  fundamentally,
these efforts are hopelessly inadequate to deal with the scale of the complex
information  flows present in the online world.
III.  CASE STUDIES:  Two FCC PROCEEDINGS
Notwithstanding  the  inherent difficulty  of regulating  information  flows,
steps  are being taken worldwide by governments  to constrain the  openness
of the Internet and the devices that connect to this  network of networks.  In
this  regard,  the  telecommunications  and  other  agencies  that  form  part  of
national governments are  largely ahead of the legislatures in their countries.
In particular,  congressional reluctance  to "regulate  the Internet"  in the U.S.
is being  overtaken  by the  eagerness  of the FCC  to expand  its jurisdictional
turf and maintain its relevance  in the digital age.
In  this  part,  I  focus  on  two  efforts  being  made  by  the  FCC  to  (1)
constrain the  functioning  of digital  devices  (the broadcast flag proceeding)
and  (2)  constrain  the  layer-independence  and  end-to-end  nature  of  the
Internet (the IP-enabled services proceeding).  These  two proceedings  are at
different stages of maturity.  The broadcast flag rule has been struck down
by the United States Court of Appeals  for the D.C. Circuit on jurisdictional
grounds,  and  legislation may be  introduced  to grant  the Commission  clear
jurisdiction  to  reissue  the  rule.  Early  indications  from  the  IP-enabled
services rulemaking  are that broad rules will emerge from the Commission.
A.  Broadcast  Flag  Background
The  broadcast  flag  is  beautifully  and  effectively  named,  because  it  is
neither  about  broadcast  nor  limited  to  the  waving  of a  patriotic  "flag."
Indeed, those who learn about the broadcast flag scheme quickly forget that
it is focused on protecting digital television broadcasts  and speak generally
about  the  protection  of digital  content.  And  the  "flag"  is,  in  a  sense,  the
least important part of the entire  scheme.
Let's  begin  at  the  beginning.  The  flag  is  a set  of bits  embedded  in a
digital  stream  (a  standard  adopted  by  the  Advanced  Television  Systems
Committee  ("ATSC") that signals "the bits  following this  set of bits  are to
spyware,  and other online ills,  see David R. Johnson et  al.,  The Accountable Internet: Peer
Production  ofInternet Governance,  9 Va. J.L. & Tech. 9 (2004).
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be  protected. '60   The  flag  is  itself  a  very  simple  signal.  It  is  the
implementation of the flag that matters.
The broadcast  flag  rule,61  distilled  to its  essence,  is  a mandate  that all
consumer electronics manufacturers and information technology companies
ensure that any device that touches digital television content "recognize  and
give  effect  to"  the flag  by protecting content against unauthorized  onward
distribution.  The FCC claimed that the rule would protect digital television
("DTV") broadcasts from massive redistribution over the Internet.
The  key reason  for the  adoption  of the broadcast  flag  was  the  studios'
(not the broadcasters')  worries about the "Napsterization"  of their content.62
The  threat  of digital  redistribution  is particularly  acute  for movie  studios
and  other video  content producers  because their business models  are today
highly  dependent  on  repurposing  programming.  The  current  movie  studio
business model  is based on  studios'  ability to  exploit multiple  distribution
streams for each work they produce.  Licensing and distribution agreements
for  these  windows  (domestic  and  international  box  office,  airline
performances, pay-per-view,  rental, home sale, satellite, premium and basic
cable,  over-the-air  broadcast, etc.)  result in payment  to  the studios.  If key
(expensive)  content  files  can  be  found  "in  the  wild,"  online,  the  studios'
fear is that no one will pay for them.
In  order  to  avoid  this  "Napsterization,"  the  FCC  established  a  new,
controversial,  and  extraordinarily  broad regulatory  regime  that  mandated
the use  of "authorized"  content protection  technologies  by virtually  every
consumer  electronics  product  and  computer  product-including  digital
television  sets,  digital  cable  set-top  boxes,  direct  broadcast  satellite
("DBS") receivers,  personal video  recorders ("PVRs"), DVD recorders,  D-
60.  Advanced Television Sys. Comm.,  ATSC A/65B:  Program and System Information
Protocol  for  Terrestrial  Broadcast  and  Cable  (2003),  available  at
http://www.atsc.org/standards/a  65b.pdf.  This  standard  defines  the  way  that broadcasters
must  include  program  name  and  content  information  in  TV  broadcasts.  The  Advanced
Television Systems  Committee  standard defines  a  "redistribution  control"  parameter. Id. at
78-79.  This is  the "broadcast  flag"  to which  receivers  of television  signals,  including  PCs
with tuner cards, must adhere.
61.  Digital  Broad.  Content  Prot.,  18  F.C.C.R.  23,550  (2003)  (FCC  report,  order,  and
further notice of proposed rule).
62.  "Napsterization"  is shorthand for the music  industry's claim that rampant online  file
trading has led to a substantial diminution  in revenues.
The  threat  [to  Hollywood  executives]  is  the  specter  of a  new  Napster-like
sensation that would  make  it easy for Internet  users to bypass  the studios  and  to
view and swap  movies for free.  No service with such  wide appeal  looms-yet-
but studio executives have been studying the  music industry's experience  with file-
swapping  services  such  as  Napster.  And  while  no  one  will  say  it  out  loud,
privately  they  admit  they're terrified  Hollywood  will be Napsterized:  that  some
college  kid will post  a movie-swapping  program that will  explode  in  popularity,
swiftly  creating  a  ravenous  audience  of millions  of users  who  will  expect  free
access to Hollywood blockbusters.
Laura  Rich, Analysis:  Hollywood Braces for  'Napsterization,' CNN.com,  Jan.  10,  2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/computing/01/10/hollywood.napsterization.idg/.
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VHS  recorders,  and  computers  with  tuner  cards.63  Specifically,  the  order
required  that  all  devices  or  software  manufactured  after  July  2005  that
could receive  TV signals (including  personal  computers  ("PCs")  equipped
with a tuner card) (1) check for the presence of the flag, (2)  store and record
flagged  content  using  "authorized  technologies,"  and  (3)  allow
transmissions  through  digital  interfaces  (and  only  protected  digital
interfaces)  only  to  other  devices  that  had  an  approved  copy-protection
system  installed.64  As a practical  matter, this meant that the flagged digital
content  would  thereafter  be  blocked  from  distribution  (1)  to  any  other
electronic  device  (like  a  cell  phone  or  PC  or  DVD  recorder)  unless  that
device was itself compliant  with the flag scheme, or (2) over the Internet.65
In other words, a membrane was  mandated by the FCC:  "[T]hese  kinds  of
bits shall not pass through this barrier."
Until the FCC could settle on a new regime for approval of "authorized"
technologies,  it itself decided  (with a great deal  of input  from  the  content
industry)  which  copy  protection  technologies  manufacturers  would  be
allowed  to use.66  The FCC's process blocked  many proposed new uses of
digital  television  content  that  involved  transmission  over  the  public
Internet.67  Of the thirteen  proposed  technologies,  at least  four  originally
included  plans  for  allowing  limited  transmissions  of  encrypted  flagged
content  over  the  Internet  to  a  specified  group  of people.68  Following
objections  from  the  Motion  Picture  Association  of  America  ("MPAA")
made  to  the  FCC, three  of those companies  agreed  to drop  their Internet-
related plans.69  Thus, all of the approved technologies, save one, prohibited
transmission  over the  public Internet  of flagged  content.  TiVoGuard,  the
lone  holdout  against  the  MPAA's  forceful  demands  to  the  FCC  that  all
thirteen  technology  providers  revise  their  plans,  itself  permitted
63.  The rule provided that a digital TV demodulator manufactured after July 2005 could
not lawfully send unprotected (unencrypted)  content to any output, except in a set of specific
cases:  (1) as  analog output  (at  least  until  the  FCC closes  the  "analog  hole");  (2)  through
specific  digital  output  formats which  must  maintain  the presence  of the  broadcast  flag and
are protected by an "Authorized  Digital Output Protection Technology;"  or, (3) in encrypted
form, to devices  that also follow the broadcast  flag  rules. See Digital  Broad Content Prot.,
18 F.C.C.R. at 23,589.
64.  See id.
65.  Id.
66.  Digital Output Prot. Tech.  & Recording Method Certifications,  19 F.C.C.R.  15,876,
15,907  (2004)  (FCC  order);  Certifications  for  Digital  Output  Prot.,  Tech.  &  Recording
Methods  to be Used in Covered Demodulator  Prods.,  19  F.C.C.R. 4732 (2004)  (FCC public
notice).
67.  Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., All Eyes on TiVo:  The Broadcast Flag and the Internet
(2004), available  at http://www.cdt.org/copyright/  20040726tivoflag.pdf.
68.  These  four  are  Thomson's  SmartRight  Technology,  RealNetworks's  Helix  DRM
Trusted  Recorder,  Microsoft's  Windows  Media  Digital  Rights  Management  Technology,
and TiVo's TiVo Guard proposal.
69.  All save TiVo agreed to insert "time to live" ("TTL") and "round trip time"  ("RTT")
limitations  in  the packets  generated by the  protection technology.  These limitations  mean
that packets  can travel  no more than three hops  (in no more than seven milliseconds) before
expiring-so they will not get very far. See Digital Output Prot.  Tech. & Recording Method
Certifications,  19 F.C.C.R. at  15,907.
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transmissions only to a single computer with a "dongle"  (a small device that
plugs  into  a  computer  port  that  prevents  illicit  copies  of  software  from
being  made)  attached  or  within  a  constrained  personal  network.70  The
broadcast  flag  scheme  thus had an extraordinarily  broad  scope. It created  a
whole  new  regime  of constraining  regulation  all  at  once:  restrictions  on
Internet use; design  mandates  for consumer electronic equipment,  including
the  traditionally  open-platform  PC;  and  licensing  requirements  for  any
device  that  connects  to  the  regulated  device.  Unpredictable,  amplifying,
and  possibly conflicting  results from these  downstream effects  were likely
to  follow  (and may  still  follow  if Congress authorizes  the  Commission  to
readopt the order).
In  the  course  of  defending  its  authority  to  regulate  equipment
manufacturers  in  order  to  effectuate  the  flag  scheme,  the  FCC  broadly
asserted  that  it  had  had jurisdiction  since  1934  over  any  device  that  was
"associated  with the  overall  circuit  of messages  sent  and received  over all
interstate  radio  and wire communication." 71  In  other words, FCC  claimed
that  anything  that  had  some  relationship  with  a  U.S.  wire  or  radio
communication was subject to its design authority.  This breathtaking-and,
as the D.C. Circuit found, illegal-assertion  swept within its boundaries all
computers,  car  radios,  VCRs,  portable  music  devices,  and  bedside  alarm
clocks.  Although  the  Commission  conceded  that this  was the first time  it
had  exercised  such jurisdiction  over  equipment  manufacturers,  it  claimed
that "the nation now stands at a juncture where  such exercise of authority  is
necessary."
72
B.  The Flag and  Membranes
Although  the  broadcast  flag proceeding  nominally  targeted  receivers  of
television  broadcasts, and thus  appeared to  have  limited impact  on the  rest
of  the  world  of  machines-particularly  because  more  than  eighty-five
percent  of  Americans  receive  television  broadcasts  through  cable  and
satellite  connections  that are  subject  to  different  rules73-its  actual  scope
was  much broader.  Our PCs and  televisions now collaborate  to  store  and
display  live  TV,  movies,  music,  videos,  and  photos  across  broadband
connections  and within home  networks.  We  are  all using  digital  cameras,
70.  Id. at  15,887.
71.  Brief for  Respondents  at  17,  Am. Library  Ass'n  v. FCC,  406  F.3d  689  (D.C.  Cir.
2005) (No. 04-1037).
72.  Digital Output Prot. Tech.  &  Recording Method Certifications,  19  F.C.C.R.  at
15,889.
73.  See,  e.g.,  University  of Pennsylvania:  Research  at Penn:  Business:  Television's
Digital  Dilemma  (Aug.  28,  2002),
http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?427&bus.  As  for  digital  cable  and
satellite  TV, the content industry made  a direct deal  with cable and satellite broadcasters  to
impose content  protection controls on all future  television devices.  The resulting negotiated
rules  were  approved  as  part  of the  "Plug  &  Play"  proceeding  that  facilitated  the  direct
connection  of digital  navigation  devices  or  other  customer  premises  equipment  to  cable
television  systems. Commercial Availability of  Navigation Devices & Compatibility  Between
Cable Sys. & Consumer  Elec. Equip., 68 Fed. Reg. 35,818 (Jun.  17,  2003).
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camcorders,  and phones that behave like  cameras.  No manufacturer  of any
one  of  these  devices  would  want  to  invest  in  creating  two  lines  of
products-one  to  consort  with  devices  that  have  something  to  do  with
television  broadcast  content,  and  one  to  live  in  a  world  unconnected  to
television.  The goal-and the  operating  assumption-of manufacturers  is
convergence  of the various  devices  they work with, not separation.  Thus,
the  impact  of  this  rule  was  designed  to  be  felt  across  all  consumer
electronics devices.
This was a direct attack on the openness  of these many  devices.  It was
an  attack  on  their  ability  to  connect  to  other  devices  and  the  Internet,  to
permit  transformation and  combination of digital  content,  and  to allow  for
the voluntary  creation  of information  flow membranes.  To  the  extent that
any  manufacturer  of  any  device  wished  to  have  that  device  connect  to
devices  that touched broadcast  content, that manufacturer  would have  had
to  comply  with  the  licensing  rules  authorized  by  the  flag  proceeding--
which in turn would have limited interoperability  to those devices that were
themselves  compliant.74  This  meant  that  the  device  would  have  had  to
ensure  that  its  digital  outputs  were  constrained  by  an  Authorized  Digital
Output Protection  Technology.  It  could  not have  stored  or recorded  this
content  unless  access  by  a noncompliant  device  to  that content  could not
occur.75  And  once  a  device  was  trained  to  recognize  and  adhere  to  the
demands  of  the  broadcast  flag,  there  was  no  reason  that  many  more
varieties of digital content would  not have been similarly flagged.76  Open
devices  that  allowed  information  flows  in  and  out, permitted  snippets  of
content to be mixed  with other information  and made  into a transformative
work,  and  allowed  unauthorized  access  to  the  results  of  these
transformations were on the way to being forbidden.
The broadcast flag  scheme adopted  by the FCC (one  that Congress  may
authorize in the wake of the May 2005 D.C. Circuit ruling striking it down)
may  have been just  a  first step  towards  a much  more  constrained  future
world  of devices. 77  It  is  a  step  that  will  be  echoed  across  the  world.
Canada  will  likely  move  quickly  to  create  a  broadcast  flag  regime.7 8
74.  47 C.F.R. § 73.9004 (2005).
75.  Id.
76.  Broadcasters  may choose to use their new spectrum  for multi-casting  several  lower-
resolution  streams at once-making  new digital services  possible.  There  is no limit on the
nature of the material to which flags can be applied by broadcasters;  wide swathes of data in
the public domain could be  flagged just as easily as  first-run movies.
77.  Some  might  say  that  the real  question  is  "what  can be  flagged,"  rather  than "can
flagged  content  traverse  the  Internet."  Because  flagging  is  so  easy  and  subject  to  no
constraints,  it  will  be  widely  adopted-and  may  cover  public  domain  content,  factual
material  unprotected  by  copyright,  and  news.  It  is  not politically  feasible  or  practically
possible to put the genie back in the bottle and mandate limits on what can be flagged.
78.  See Michael Geist, Advancing Technology Threatens Cultural Policy, Toronto  Star,
Nov.  8,  2004,  at  D3;  Michael  Geist,  Mr. Minister, Please Protect the  Public Interest,
Toronto  Star, Sept. 6,  2004,  at C2;  Radio Advisory Board of Canada,  Key Industry  Canada
Activities  and  Priorities  for  2005  (2004),
http://www.rabc.ottawa.on.ca/e/Files/5.%201C%2ORpt.doc  (stating  that  standards  priority
work for 2005 will include "recognition  of the broadcast flag").
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Moreover,  member states  of the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization
("WIPO")79 are  continuing  work  on  a  treaty80  that  is  planned  to  protect
broadcasting signals and webcasts. 81  The current draft of this treaty, which
is  being  pushed  hard by the  MPAA  through U.S.  officials,  states that  the
member states "recogniz[e]  the need to introduce new international  rules  in
order  to  provide  adequate  solutions  to  the  questions  raised  by economic,
social,  cultural  and  technological  developments" 82   and  grants  to
broadcasters  (and  potentially  webcasters)  for  a  term  of  fifty  years  "the
exclusive  right of authorizing  the  retransmission  [defined very  broadly  to
include  all  forms  of communication  of a broadcast  by  anyone,  including
over computer networks] by any means of their broadcasts." 83
Thus,  this  treaty  would  give  broadcasters,  cablecasters,  and,  under  the
U.S. proposal, webcasters,  a broad range of new exclusive rights.  Although
the most recent  WIPO discussion of this treaty ended in confusion when the
chairman  of the responsible  committee  (in a transparent  effort to push  the
treaty  along  and  isolate  dissenters)  suddenly  called  for a  vote rather  than
continuing  to work for consensus,84  it is likely  that worldwide protections
for broadcasters,  webcasters,  and the "technical  protection  measures"  they
use will be agreed to in some form.  It is my view that this treaty is likely to
form the  basis for  global  adoption  of broadcast  flag  schemes modeled  on
the U.S. version.
C.  IP-Enabled  Services Background
On March  10,  2004, the FCC released a Notice  of Proposed Rulemaking
for  IP-enabled  services. 85  The  FCC  made  clear  that  "the  scope  of this
proceeding-and  the  term  'IP-enabled  services,'  as  it  is  used  here-
includes  services  and  applications  relying  on  the  Internet  Protocol
family."86  Thus, the IP-Enabled  Services  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
suggests that the Commission views its regulatory authority  as extending  to
end-user  software,  network  hardware,  corporate  and  community  websites
and more.
79.  "WIPO  is  an  intergovernmental  organization  based  in  Geneva,  Switzerland
responsible for the promotion of the protection  of intellectual rights throughout the world.  It
is one of the  16 specialized agencies of the United Nations  system of organizations." ICANN
Glossary, http://www.icann.org/general/glossary.htm  (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
80.  WIPO,  Member  States,  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/member-states.jsp  (last
visited Oct.  19, 2005).
81.  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization,  Standing  Committee  on  Copyright  and
Related Rights,  Twelfth Session, Revised Consolidated  Text for a Treaty on the Protection  of
Broadcasting  Organizations,  SCCR/12/2  (Oct.  4,  2004),  available  at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_12/sccr_12_2.doc.
82.  Id. at  13.
83.  Id.  at 39.
84.  Carolyn  Deere,  WIPO  Broadcasting Treaty  Discussions End  in  Controversy,
Confusion, Intell.  Prop. Watch, Nov.  22,  2004, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?
p=  10&res= 1024  ff&print=0.
85.  IP-Enabled Servs.,  19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004) (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking).
86.  Id. at 4864 n. 1.
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In  the  IP  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  the  Commission,  while
acknowledging  that the Internet had "become one of the greatest drivers  of
consumer  choice  and  benefit,  technical  innovation,  and  economic
development  in  the  United  States  in  the  last  ten  years," 87  stated  that
"provisions  designed  to  ensure  disability  access,  consumer  protection,
emergency  911  service, law  enforcement  access for authorized  wiretapping
purposes,  consumer privacy,  and  others  [social  policy  concerns]-should
continue  to  have  relevance  as  communications  migrate  to  IP-enabled
services." 88   The  IP  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  suggests  that
traditional  "common  carrier"  regulation,  in  which  service  providers  file
tariffs, respond  to interconnection obligations, and pay access  fees, may not
be  appropriate  for IP-enabled  services. 89  But  the  IP  Notice  of Proposed
Rulemaking  indicates that "social  policies"  may be appropriate  for  some or
all IP-enabled services.
90
On August 9,  2004, the FCC released its Communications Assistance  for
Law  Enforcement  ("CALEA")  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,91
suggesting that some subset of IP-enabled  services should be designed so as
to assist law  enforcement officials in implementing wiretap  orders.  The IP
Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  and  CALEA  Notice  of  Proposed
Rulemaking are closely linked, and together suggest that online services  are
subject  to  "social  policy"  rules  established  by  the  FCC-including  the
policy that some  services be required to build in basic wiretap capabilities.
One  key reason  for the  release  of the  IP  and  CALEA  Notices  was  the
desire  of  incumbent  telephone  companies  to  maintain  a  level  regulatory
playing  field  in  the  Internet  era.  Calls  made  with  VolP  services  that
connect  to  the  traditional  telephone  network  (the  "PSTN")  are  twenty
percent  to  thirty  percent  less  expensive  than  calls  made using  the  PSTN,
because the Internet is not taxed the way the PSTN is.  And calls made with
VoIP that do not connect to the PSTN are often completely free or very  low
cost.92  This causes heartaches for companies that base their business model
on the  PSTN,  because  they  are  stuck  with  providing  universal  telephone
service,  911  emergency  services,  guaranteeing  wiretapping  access  for
police,  and providing  access  for the  hearing-impaired-and  are  subject to
extensive  taxes  and  fees  imposed by  the  FCC and  the states.  The rise  of
87.  Id.  at 4864.
88.  Id.  at 4867.
89.  Id.
90.  Id. The IP-Enabled  Services Notice  of Proposed  Rulemaking  focuses  on questions
relating to emergency  services,  access by individuals with  disabilities,  consumer protection,
and universal service.  The FCC uses the term "social policy concerns"  as shorthand  for this
list of issues plus the issues raised  in the Communications Assistance  for Law Enforcement
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See IP-Enabled  Servs.,  19 F.C.C.R. at 4879-80.
91.  Commc'ns Assistance  for Law Enforcement  Act & Broadband Access  & Servs.,  19
F.C.C.R.  15,676 (2004)  (FCC notice of proposed rulemaking and declaratory ruling).
92.  Voice of IP  ("VoIP")  is  an  IP-enabled service-transmitting  telephone calls  over a
data  network, using packet-switching  to save  costs. See NOVACON:  Glossary  of Internet
Terms,  Chicago  Comparison, VolP,  http://www.novacon.com/faq_s-z.htm  (last  visited Oct.
20, 2005).
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VoIP  also  causes  heartaches  for  state  and  federal  government.  As  more
people  begin  using  unregulated  VoIP  applications  instead  of  the  taxed
traditional  telephone system, federal and state governments  will start to lose
billions of dollars.
By  the  third  quarter of 2003,  at  least  fifteen states  either  had begun  to
regulate  or  were  considering  the  regulation  of IP  voice  offerings.93  In
particular,  in  September  2003,  the  California  State  Public  Utilities
Commission ("PUC") told six VoIP companies that connect to the PSTN to
get  a license  in order  to  provide  phone  services  to people  in California. 94
Minnesota  and  New  York  went  the  other  direction,  ruling  that  VoIP
providers-even  those  connecting  to  the PSTN-were not  subject  to state
taxing and tariffing.95  Both the California and New York PUCs announced
that they would  pull back,  giving the FCC  time  to come  up with  rules for
VoIP.  The March 2004 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was at least in part
a response  to these state efforts.  Vonage, a VoIP company that connects to
the PSTN, had successfully called for FCC preemption of any state taxes or
regulation of VoIP.
96
A  second  reason  for  the  breadth  of  the  IP  and  CALEA  Notices  of
Proposed Rulemaking  was FCC's desire to maintain its relevance  in an era
of decreasing  reliance  on telephones.97  The  old world of circuit-switched
networks  and  monopoly  providers,  on  which  FCC's  regulatory  scheme
depended,  is  rapidly  being  replaced  by  a  new  age  of  packet-switched
networks for which scarcity  simply is not an issue. 98  To date, and with very
93.  See  Comments  of SBC  Communications,  Inc.  at  5-6,  Vonage  Holding  Corp.'s
Petition  for  Declaratory  Ruling,  WC  Docket  No.  03-211  (Oct.  27,  2003),  available at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/102803_36.pdf.
94.  The  Director of the California  Public Utilities  Commission, John Leutza, noted that
the  distinction  between  land  and  Internet  phone  providers  was  minimal.  Ben  Chamy,
California  to  Regulate  VoIP  Providers,  CNET  News.com,  Sept.  30,  2003,
http://news.com.com/Califomia+to+regulate+VoIP+providers/2100-7352_3-5084711  .html.
95.  The  Minnesota  Public  Utilities  Commission  ("PUC")  ruled  that  Vonage's  VolP
service  was an  intrastate  telephone  service,  subject to  state  law.  Vonage  Holdings  Corp.'s
Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Pub. Util.  Comm'n,
19  F.C.C.R.  22,404  (2004)  (memorandum  opinion  and  order);  see also Vonage  Holdings
Corp.  v. Minn. Public Utilities  Commission, 290 F.  Supp. 2d 993  (D. Minn. 2003).  Vonage
was able to have the Public Utilities Commission's  determination overturned on appeal when
a  federal  judge  held  that  VolP  is  an information  service  not  subject  to  state jurisdiction.
Linda Haugsted,  States Wrestle with VolP Approaches; As Cable Ops and Others Jump into
New  Phone Frontier, Regulators Eye  Turf Defenses, Vonage  Press  Room,  Jan.  5,  2004,
http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press  news.php?PR=200401  05_1.
96.  Vonage Petition  for a Declaratory  Ruling, 19  F.C.C.R. at  22,404.
97.  This  is  similar  to  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission's  effort  to  retain  its
relevance  as  the  national  transportation  landscape  evolved.  See  Paul  Dempsey,  The
Insterstate Commerce Commission-Disintegration  of an American Legal Institution, 34
Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1984-85).
98.  Mark  A.  Lemley  &  Lawrence  Lessig,  The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband  Era, 48 UCLA  L.  Rev.  925  (2001); Jonathan
Weinberg,  The  Internet  and  "Telecommunications  Services, "  Universal  Service
Mechanisms, Access  Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System,  16  Yale  J. on
Reg.  211,  225-38  (1999)  ("Packet-switched  networks  are  taking  over,  and  the
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modest  exceptions  that  can  be  directly  tied  to  the  FCC's
telecommunications  authority,  the  FCC  has  not  had  much  to  say  about
"regulating the Internet."99
Over the  last thirty years,  the FCC has,  however, had  something  to say
about  regulating  computers-and  it  has  decided  to  leave  them  alone.
Beginning in  1971,  the FCC conducted three proceedings  (called Computer
I, Computer II, and  Computer III) about the relationships between computer
data  processing  (computers  used  to  direct  network  operations)  and
telecommunications  (end  users  using  computers  to  communicate)  which
resulted  in  FCC  pronouncements  that  where  data  was  transformed  by
computers in use by common  carriers before being presented  to human  end
users, these  services  (called  "enhanced  services") would  be  "unregulated"
by  the  FCC. 1 00   Basic  services,  by  contrast,  which  provided  only
transmission  of  communications,  would  be  regulated  under  FCC's
"common carrier"  Title II regime.1 0 1  The Commission predicted, correctly,
that the  development and availability of "enhanced  services"  would best be
promoted  if regulatory rules  and procedures  were  not "interjected  between
technology and its marketplace  applications."' 1 02
The  passage  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  (the  "Act")
represented  a codification of this "unregulation"  approach.  The Act defined
"Information  Services"  as  "the  offering  of  a  capability  for  generating,
acquiring,  storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available  information  via  telecommunications,  and  includes  electronic
publishing." 1 0 3  The Commission  stated that "information  services  consist
of all  services  that  the Commission  previously  considered  to  be enhanced
communications  world  is  changing.");  see also  Reno  v.  ACLU,  521  U.S.  844,  868-70
(1997).
99.  The  FCC  did  impose  conditions  in  connection  with  approving  the  AOL/Time
Warner merger, requiring that AOL's instant  messaging client interoperate with competitors
and  that  Time  Warner  should  make  capacity  on  its  cable  systems  available  for  Internet
access  by  competitors.  But  the  FCC's  power  to  impose  these  conditions  was  founded
exclusively  on  the  FCC's  approval  of  transfers  of licenses  for  Time  Warner's  cable
companies,  broadcast  companies,  and  telephone  interests  to  the  merged  entity.  See
Applications  for  Consent  to  the  Transfer  of  Control  of  Licenses  &  Section  214
Authorizations  by Time Warner Inc.  & Am.  Online, Inc.,  Transferors, to AOL  Time Warner
Inc., Transferee,  16 F.C.C.R. 6547 (2001) (FCC opinion and order).
100.  Amendment  of  Section  64.702  of  the  Comm'n's  Rules  &  Regulations  (Second
Computer Inquiry),  72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979)  (tentative decision  and further notice of inquiry
and  rulemaking),  rule modification granted by  77  F.C.C.2d  384  (1980)  (final  decision),
reconsidered,  84 F.C.C.2d  50  (1981), further reconsidered,  88  F.C.C.2d  512 (1981),  affd
sub nom. Computer & Comm'cns  Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d  198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub. nom, Nat'l Ass'n  of Regulatory  Util.  Comm'rs, 461  U.S.  938 (1983),  aff'd on
second  further reconsideration,  56  Rad.  Reg.  2d  (P  &  F)  301  (1984)  (FCC  opinion  and
order).
101.  Common  carriers  are subject to rate  regulation, tariffs,  and co-location  rules.  Wire
or Radio Communications  Act, 47 U.S.C.  §§ 201-229  (2000); see Orloff v. FCC,  124 S.  Ct.
2907  (2004).
102.  Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm 'n's Rules & Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d at
429.
103.  47 U.S.C.  § 153 (2000).
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services." 1 04  This  signaled that  all "information  services"-an  apparently
broad  category  of  computer-assisted  communications-would  be
"unregulated"  by  the  FCC  (as  "enhanced  services"  had  been). 1 0 5   In
particular, as discussed  in Part I,  the Act mandated as "policy of the United
States" that development and use of the Internet be "unfettered by federal or
state regulation."'
1 0 6
But as the  Internet world continued to explode,  some of the regional Bell
operating companies-heavily  regulated by the FCC-supported the FCC's
call  for "social  polices"  to be  applied to  IP-enabled  services. 1 07  Chairman
Michael  Powell,  in  a  separate  statement  accompanying  the  IP-enabled
services Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,  said "rules designed to ensure law
enforcement  access,  universal  service,108  disability  access  and  emergency
104.  Implementation  of  Sections  255  &  251(a)(2)  of the  Commc'ns  Act  of  1934,  as
Enactedby the Telecomms. Act of 1996,  16 F.C.C.R. 6417, 6450 n.180 (1999)  (FCC report,
order, and further notice of inquiry).
105.  IP-enabled  services convert information  from one form  to another,  process, retrieve
and  store  information,  and  perform  many  other  functions  that  constitute  information
services,  including  facilitating  subscriber  interaction  with  stored  information  (such  as
customer profiles).  They thus are classified  as "information services"  to which Title II  and
certain other regulations do not apply.  47 U.S.C.  § 153(20)  (defining "information  service").
By  contrast,  "telecommunications  services,"  which  are  subject  to  Title  II  regulations,  are
defined as  "the  transmission, between or among points specified  by the user, of information
of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as  sent and
received."  Id.  §  153(43),  (46)  (2000)  (defining  "telecommunications"  and
"telecommunications  service").
106.  Id. § 230(b)(2).
107.  See Comments  of the  Verizon  Telephone  Companies  at  1, IP-Enabled  Servs., WC
Docket  No.  04-36  (May  28,  2004),  available  at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/060204_86.pdf  (arguing  that  IP-enabled  services  are
not subject  to traditional  forms of economic  regulation, but  should be  subject  to  "discrete
requirements  only  when  necessary  to  support  specific  policy  objectives");  Comments  of
SBC Communications  Inc.  at  57,  Vonage  Holding  Corp.'s Petition  for Declaratory  Ruling,
WC  Docket  No.  03-211  (Oct.  27,  2003),  available  at
http://www.neca.org/wawatch/wwpdf/l02803_36.pdf  ("The  Commission's  assertion  of
jurisdiction to address the public policy concerns  surrounding IP-enabled services  would not
remotely thwart,  and  is  indeed  necessary  to promote,  the  substantive  policy  goals  of the
Communications Act.").  As BellSouth argued,
To the extent that a particular IP-enabled  service is an "information  service" under
the law,  the Commission  should leave  such services  largely unregulated except to
the extent that, under its Title I authority, the Commission  needs to  establish clear
expectations  with  regard  to  social  obligations  such  as  public  safety,  universal
service,  911 and disability access.
Comments  of BellSouth Corporation at 23,  IP-Enabled Servs.,  WC  Docket No. 04-36  (May
28,  2004),  available  at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/SilverStream/Pages/edocsAdvanceSearch.html;  cf
Comments  of  Qwest  Communications  International  Inc.  at  36,  IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC
Docket  No.  04-36  (May  28,  2004),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native  orpdf=pdf&id-document=6516199524  (advocating that the Commission  should
exercise its ancillary jurisdiction  to apply  noneconomic  regulations  to  IP-enabled  services
and applications  only on a showing of necessity to achieve an important objective under the
Telecommunications Act).
108.  "Universal  service"  is a shorthand  designation  for a very complicated set of implicit
and explicit subsidies initiated  in the 1930s that attempt to provide phone service to everyone
in the U.S.  regardless  of distance  from  central  switches or ability  to pay.  FCC,  Universal
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911  service  can and  should be  preserved  in the new architecture."'1 0 9  The
FCC had  found a new role  for itself:  ensuring "social  policy"  structures  in
the  online  world.  This  would  enable  the  FCC  to  remain  relevant  and
necessary  in  the  age  of the  Interet,  while  not  extending  all  of  the  old
economic tariffing rules to online services.
There  is  substantial  tension  between  this. stance  and  the  FCC's  overall
deregulatory  (or "unregulatory")  agenda.  When Pulver.com filed a petition
for  a  declaratory  rulemaking  with  the  FCC,  asking  that  its  Free  World
Dialup  ("FWD")  service (which is  essentially  an instant messaging  service
with  voice  capabilities  that  does  not  connect  to  the  traditional  telephone
system)  be  declared  not  to  be  a  "telecommunications  service,"  the  FCC
responded  that  FWD  was  an  "unregulated  information  service  subject  to
FCC's jurisdiction." 1 " 0  In  other words, the FCC put FWD in the bucket of
services  that are  not  subject  to  tariffs and rate  regulation  under Title  II  of
the  Communications  Act. 111  In general,  then-Chairman  Powell  was vocal
in  his  support  for  an  "unregulated"  Internet,  at  one  point  telling  USA
Today, "If you're going to  say to  me that Voice  over IP  is something  that
needs  regulation,  then  you're  going  to  have  to  explain  to  me  why  e-mail
isn't also, or streaming video or instant messaging is not also."' 12
Some  media  outlets  read  this  "unregulation"  and  "nonregulation"
language  to  mean that  Internet  applications  would  remain  unregulated by
the FCC. 113  But "unregulation"  does  not mean  "no  regulation."  "Social
Service  Home  Page,  http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universalservice/welcome.html  (last  visited
Oct. 20,  2005) (providing the FCC's definition of "universal  service").
109.  IP-Enabled  Servs.,  19  F.C.C.R. 4863,  4951  (2004) (notice  of proposed  rulemaking,
separate  statement  of Commissioner  Michael  K.  Powell);  see also IP-Enabled  Servs.,  19
F.C.C.R. at 4893.
Congress stated that the Internet  should remain free from regulation.  But Congress
also  has  stated  public  policy  goals  that  would  presumably  continue  to  apply  as
communications networks  evolve.  For example, it has stated that universal  service
should  be  maintained,  that  telecommunications  equipment  and  services  should
remain usable by people with disabilities,  that prompt emergency service should be
available to the public through the 911  system, and  that communications  should be
accessible  to law  enforcement  officers  acting on  the basis of a lawfully  obtained
warrant.
Id. (footnote  omitted).  All of these "public policy  goals" have  been expressed  in the past by
Congress with respect only to telecommunications  services-common  carriers.
110.  Petition  for  Declaratory  Ruling  that  pulver.com's  Free  World  Dialup  Is  Neither
Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Serv.,  19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 3307 (2004).
111.  Communications  Act  of  1934,  Pub.  L.  No.  73-416,  48  Stat.  1064  (codified  as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
112.  Reuters, FCC Chief  Plans  No Internet Phone  Regulation, USA Today, Jan. 22, 2004,
at  lB.
113.  The headline  for  the FCC's press release announcing the pulver.com decision read,
"FCC  Rules  that  pulver.com's  Free  World  Dialup  Service  Should  Remain  Free  From
Unnecessary  Regulation,"  and many people understood this to mean that IP-enabled services
would  not  be  subject  to  any  rules  imposed  by  the  FCC.  Press  Release,  Fed.  Commc'n
Comm'n,  FCC Rules  That  pulver.com's  Free  World  Dialup  Service  Should  Remain Free
from  Unnecessary  Regulation  (Feb.  12,  2004),  available  at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-243869A1.pdf,  see, e.g.,  Interview
with  Jeff  Pulver,  Co-founder,  Vonage,  BroadBandReports.com  (Feb.  18,  2004),
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/39049  ("Your victory, thanks to years of effort, for the
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policies,"  including  design  mandates  under  CALEA  and  payment  into
Universal  Service  funds,  were  envisioned  by  the  FCC  to  be  part  of
"unregulation."  Although  it  is  still quite  unclear  what social  policies  the
FCC  will  require  of what  categories  of IP-enabled  services,  the  FCC's
stance is consistent:  The Commission  strongly believes it has the authority
to bring  social policies to bear on the Internet, and has  put forth a menu  of
such policies that it believes may apply to IP-enabled services.
D.  CALEA Background 14
Unlike  the  flag  context,  in  which  we  have  a  fully  articulated  (if
temporarily  stalled)  regime  to  look  at,  most  of  the  IP-enabled
services/CALEA  "social  policies"  rulemaking  is  still  wide  open  for
discussion.  But  the  CALEA  process  signals  that  the  FCC may  take  the
view  that  permission  will  be  needed  from  government  authorities  when
designing a wide variety of services,  computers,  and web  sites that use the
Internet  protocol.  In  other  words,  information  flow  membranes  will  be
governmentally  mandated as part of the design  process for  online products
and services.
Under  the  federal  wiretap  statute,  all  electronic  communications-no
matter whether they are in the form of faxes,  emails, or VoIP calls--can be
intercepted legally if a wiretap  order has been obtained."I5  Any provider  of
any  electronic  communications  service  is  required  to  furnish  information
and technical assistance for such an interception. 16
With  the  rise  of digital  telephony  in  the  early  1990s,  law  enforcement
was  worried  that  new  digital  systems would be  more  difficult  to  tap than
analog  systems,  and  wanted  to  ensure  that  it  would  be  able  speedily  to
implement wiretap  orders.  Law enforcement may also have wanted to shift
the  cost  of adjusting  to  different  telecommunications  carriers'  systems  to
the carriers  themselves.  After  substantial  narrowing negotiations,  CALEA
was  enacted  in  1994.117  CALEA  requires  that  telecommunications
time being  frees  [Free World Dial-Up]  and other 'pure'  VoIP providers  from regulation. Do
you expect further battles down the road?").
114.  Some portions of this section appear in revised form in Susan P. Crawford,  Someone
to Watch  over Me:  Social  Policies for  the Internet (2005)  (unpublished manuscript,  on file
with author).
115.  Wire  and  Electronic  Communications  Interception  and  Interception  of  Oral
Communications,  18  U.S.C.  §§  2510-2522  (2000).  Thus,  cable  companies,  broadband
access  providers  generally,  and  VoIP  service  providers  are  all  already  subject  to  a
surveillance assistance requirement. Id. § 2518(4).
116.  See id. § 2518(4).
117.  Pub.  L.  No.  103-414,  108  Stat.  4279  (1994)  (codified  as  amended  at  18  U.S.C.  §
2522  and  47  U.S.C.  §§  229,  1001-1010  (2000)).  Then-Federal  Bureau  of Investigation
Director  Louis  Freeh  said  during  a joint  congressional  hearing  on  the  Communications
Assistance  for Law Enforcement  Act  ("CALEA")  in  1994  that  a  broader  bill  covering  all
communications service providers had been "rejected out of hand." J. Hearings on H.R. 4922
and S. 2375  Before the Subcomm.  on Tech.  and the Law  of the S.  Comm. on the  Judiciary
and  the  Subcomm.  on  Civil  and Const'l  Rights  of the  H.  Comm.  on the  Judiciary,  103rd
Cong. 49 (1994).
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providers--common  carriers  of  telephone  communications,1 8-provide
certain  specific  capacities  and  capabilities  to  make  wiretapping  easier  for
law enforcement.
Even  though  the  Internet  had  not  come  into  common  use  in  1994,
Congress  was then well  aware of the  differences  between  circuit-switched
and  packet-switched  networks  that  I  have described  above. 1 9  Congress
specifically elected to leave Internet services out of CALEA's coverage.
120
With  the  increasing  popularity  of  VolP  services,  law  enforcement
became  concerned  that  it  would  become  difficult  to  wiretap  online
communications  that,  from their perspective, were  equivalent to  traditional
telephone  calls.  In  March  2004,  the  Department  of Justice  ("DOJ"),  the
Drug  Enforcement  Agency  ("DEA"),  and  the  Federal  Bureau  of
Investigation  ("FBI")  filed  a  joint  petition  asking  the  FCC  to  begin  a
rulemaking proceeding  focused  on CALEA implementation  for broadband
access  services  and  broadband  telephony. 121  Shortly thereafter, bills  were
introduced  in  both the  Senate 122  and  House 123  that  would  have  given the
FCC express jurisdiction  over VoIP,  but neither bill  had passed either  the
Senate or the House at the time this Article was prepared.
On  August  9,  2004,  when  the  FCC  released  its  CALEA  Notice  of
Proposed Rulemaking, it said,
[T]he Commission tentatively  concludes that CALEA applies to facilities-
based  providers  of  any  type  of  broadband  Internet  access  service-
including  wireline, cable  modem, satellite,  wireless,  and powerline-and
to managed  or mediated Voice  over  Internet Protocol  ("VoIP")  services.
These  tentative  conclusions  are  based  on  a  Commission  proposal  that
these  services  fall  under  CALEA  as  "a  replacement  for  a  substantial
portion of the local telephone exchange  service." 124
118.  47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(A).
119.  See supra  note  17.
120.  See 47 U.S.C.  § 1002(b)(2);  see also U.S.  Telecomm.  Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,
455  (D.C.  Cir.  2000) ("CALEA  does  not  cover  'information  services'  such  as  e-mail  and
Internet  access.");  H.R.  Rep.  No.  103-827(I),  at  23  (1994)  as  reprinted in  1994
U.S.C.C.A.N.  3489,  3503  (stating  that  CALEA  obligations  "do  not  apply  to  information
services, such  as electronic  mail services, or on-line services, such as Compuserve,  Prodigy,
America On-line  or Mead Data,  or Internet  service  providers").  The Commission  has found
that information  services  "such  as  electronic  mail providers  and on-line  service  providers"
are  exempt  from  CALEA.  Commc'ns  Assistance  for Law  Enforcement  Act,  15  F.C.C.R.
7105,  7119 (1999)  (FCC second report & order).
121.  Joint  Petition  for  Expedited  Rulemaking,  U.S.  Dep't  of Justice,  Fed.  Bureau  of
Investigation  & Drug Enforcement  Admin. Joint Petition for Rulemaking  to Resolve Various
Outstanding  Issues  Concerning  the  Implementation  of the  Commc'ns  Assistance  for  Law
Enforcement  Act,  RM  No.  10865  (FCC  Mar.  10,  2004),  available  at
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/20040310.calea.jper.pdf.
122.  VoIP Regulatory Freedom Act of 2004, S. 2281,  108th Cong.
123.  Advanced Internet Communications Services Act of 2004, H. 4757,  108th Cong.
124.  Press  Release,  Fed.  Commc'n  Comm'n,  FCC  Adopts  Notice  of  Proposed
Rulemaking  and  Declaratory  Ruling  Regarding  Communications  Assistance  for  Law
Enforcement  Act  (Aug.  4,  2004),  available  at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-250547A3  .pdf.
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Then,  on August  5, 2005  the  FCC ruled  that  broadband  Internet access
and  "interconnected  VoIP"  services  must  be  designed  so  as  to  make
government wiretapping easier. 125
The strength  of the  Commission's  arguments for CALEA  application  to
broadband services  and VoIP will  come under immediate scrutiny, because
there  is  an  exemption  under  section  102(8)  of CALEA  for  "information
services,"  and  VolP  is  an  "information  service." 126   In  a  comment
accompanying  the  August  5,  2005  press  release,  FCC  Commissioner
Kathleen Abernathy noted the weakness of the FCC's legal claim, saying,
Because  litigation is  as inevitable  as  death and  taxes,  and because  some
might  not  read  the  statute  to  permit  the  extension  of CALEA  to  the
broadband  Internet  access  and VoIP  services  at issue here,  I have  stated
my concern  that an approach  like  the  one  we adopt  today is not without
legal risk.
127
Thus,  in  sum,  the  FCC  interpreted  the  CALEA  statute  (which  focused
exclusively  on  digital  technology  within  the  PSTN)  to  address  online
information  applications-a category  of technologies  specifically  excluded
from CALEA's  scope.  Indeed, filed comments  in the  CALEA proceeding
suggest  that law  enforcement  authorities  are  interested  in having  CALEA
apply to all online applications. 128
What  VoIP  services  would be  required  to  do  to  assist law  enforcement
remains  quite  unclear.  Under  CALEA,  telecommunications  carriers  are
required  to  (1) enable  law  enforcement,  pursuant to  a  court order  or other
lawful  authorization,  to  access  "call-identifying  information"  that  is
"reasonably  available"  to  the  carrier,  and  (2)  to  deliver  access  to  call-
identifying  information  in  a  format  that  may  be  transmitted  to  a  remote
location.  It appears that in requesting  that CALEA be extended  to Internet
services,  law enforcement  will likely demand that standardized information
be  created  in a form  acceptable  to them.  The only  limitation  proposed in
the  CALEA  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  on  this  subject  is  that
information  will  not  be  considered  to  be  "reasonably"  available  if  the
125.  Press Release, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, FCC Requires  Certain Broadband and VoIP
Providers  to  Accommodate  Wiretaps,  Order  Stikes  Balance  Between  Law  Enforcement,
Innovation (Aug. 5, 2005).
126.  See infra notes 208-11  and accompanying text.
127.  Statement  of Kathleen  Q.  Abernathy,  FCC  Commissioner,  In re Communications
Assistance  for  Law  Enforcement  and  Broadband  Access  and  Services  (Aug.  5,  2005),
available  at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260434A3.pdf.
128.  Comments  of Eliot  Spitzer,  Attorney  General  for  the  State of New  York  at  9-10,
Commc'ns  Assistance  for  Law  Enforcement  Act  & Broadband  Access  and  Servs.,  ET
Docket  No.  04-295  (FCC  Nov.  8.  2004),  available  at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/teleconununications/filings/agcalea.pdf;  Comments  of  the
United  States  Department Of Justice at  32-33,  Commc'ns Assistance  for  Law Enforcement
Act & Broadband Access & Services, ET Docket No.  04-295 (FCC Nov. 8, 2004), available
at  http://www.askcalea.com/docs/20041108_dojcomments.pdf  [hereinafter  DOJ  CALEA
Comments]  (arguing  that  involvement  in  any ongoing  flow  of information  among  Internet
users should  be considered  "management,"  and any online services  may  be included in this
category-not just those that interconnect with the traditional telephone network).
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information  is  only  accessible  by  "significantly  modifying  a  network." 129
This  is  very  little protection  for Internet  services,  and  it seems  likely  that
such services  will end up implementing  data  and functionality  designs  that
are  pleasing  to  law  enforcement.  More  importantly,  "call  identifying
information"  is  specifically  not  supposed  to  be  available  under  CALEA
where  such  information  "may  disclose  the  physical  location  of  the
subscriber"  in the  absence  of a  lawful  court  order  (more  than just  a  pen
register  or  trap  and  trace  order). 130   Online,  of  course,  all  Internet
communications  "may  disclose"  this  information-IP  addresses  can
sometimes perform  this function,  and  the  Session  Initiation Protocol  used
for many VoIP calls will convey the physical location of the end user.131
So  far,  law  enforcement  has  refused  to  say  what  it  means  by  "call
identifying  information"  for  the  Internet, 132  and  has  suggested  that  such
information  may  be  different  for  different  entities. 133  Law  enforcement
would like the discretion to negotiate with technology companies over what
is meant by "call identifying  information"  and in what form it must be sent
to  them. 134  Just  as  innovators  in  content  protection  technologies  were
beaten down by the MPAA when they wanted to allow encrypted content to
traverse  the  public  Internet  in  the  flag  proceedings,  here  the  FBI  will
preapprove  the  design  and  capabilities  of Internet  services-with  a great
deal of enforcement  power behind  it.  Law enforcement  wants  to  decide,
once  a general  rule  is  in  place,  what  products  or  services  are  covered  by
CALEA, what information is required  to be furnished to  them and  in what
form, and who should pay for what.
Most  critically  for  the  future  of the  Internet,  law  enforcement  in  the
CALEA proceeding has made clear that it wants  to ensure that it reviews all
possibly  relevant  new  services  for compliance  with  unstated  information-
gathering  and  information-forwarding  requirements  before  these  services
are launched.  All prudent businesses will want to run their services by law
enforcement,  suggests the DOJ:  "Service  providers would be well advised
to  seek  guidance  early,  preferably  well before  deployment of a  service,  if
they believe  that their service  is  not  covered by  CALEA.... DOJ  would
129.  Commc'ns Assistance for  Law Enforcement  Act & Broadband Access  & Servs.,  19
F.C.C.R.  15,676,  15,714  (2004)  (FCC  notice  of  proposed  rulemaking  and  declaratory
ruling).
130.  47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)  (2000).
13 1.  The Internet Engineering  Task Force ("IETF")  is working  on exactly  this issue.  See
James  M.  Polk  &  Brian  Rosen,  Internet  Engineering  Task  Force,  Internet  Draft,
Requirements  for  Session  Initiation  Protocol  Conveyance  (Oct.  25,  2004),
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sipping/draft-ietf-sipping-location-requirements/draft-ietf-sipping-
location-requirements-02.txt.
132.  DOJ CALEA Comments, supra note  128,  at 42.
133.  Id.  at 7.
134.  The  Department  of Justice  ("DOJ")  has  stated  that it  prefers  to  use  a  secondary,
negotiating  process  under  CALEA  that  can  only  take  place  after  a particular  service  has
entered  the  marketplace  and  been  found  wanting  by  law  enforcement  (the  "deficiency
process") to discuss the meaning of  "call  identifying information." Id.  at 42.
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certainly  consider  a  service  provider's  failure  to request  such  guidance  in
any enforcement  action." 135
This  is a threat:  Come negotiate with us first, or you  will run the risk of
being subject to penalties later.  And, of course, innovators  will not know to
what  standards  they are  being  held  during  these  negotiations-what  "call
identifying information"  means on the Internet, what form  service providers
will have to provide  it in, or what capabilities  they will have to provide  law
enforcement.  Most alarmingly of all, these negotiations  will inevitably  end
up in design mandates;  according to the DOJ, "any definition of 'reasonably
available'  [call  identifying  information]  should be  based  on the  technical
solutions  a  carrier  and  vendor  can  achieve  when  they  first  design  the
network,  not on the unfortunate  realities that prevail  after  a non-compliant
network has already been constructed." 136
E.  IP-Enabled  Services and  Membranes
The  threats  to collective  creation of information-flow  membranes  posed
by  the  IP-enabled/CALEA  rulemakings  are  clear.  The  DOJ  will  seek  to
penalize  service  providers  that  do  not  submit  their  applications  for  pre-
launch  CALEA review.  Law  enforcement  will want to bring  "deficiency"
proceedings  against  any  online  service  or  application  provider  that  they
deem to be covered by CALEA.
What  does  this foretaste  of the  FCC's  likely actions  on CALEA  signal
for the open Internet?  The central presumption of Internet innovation will
likely be flipped as  a result of this proceeding:  Instead of "everything  not
prohibited  is permitted,"  the  new  default  setting  will  be  "everything  not
permitted is prohibited."  All new  online services will eventually be subject
to  law  enforcement  "compliance"  review  before  they  go  on  the  market.
There  is  no  limiting  principle  for  law  enforcement's  interpretation  of its
need:  Because  a voice bit is  indistinguishable from a  data bit,  all services
will eventually be covered by the DOJ's interpretation of CALEA.  And we
will not know until later  what law enforcement's  design  mandates  will be,
because  all  of this  will  be  negotiated  behind  closed  doors.  All  prudent
businesses  seeking to  avoid deficiency findings will feel the need to go ask
permission  before  launching.  So  CALEA  will  be  a  high  and  expensive
barrier  to innovation.  Smaller outfits  will  simply  crumble  rather  than  go
through pre-launch  law  enforcement review,  collaborative  and open-source
innovations will not pass law enforcement's  tests, and  a pall  of uncertainty
will be cast over the entire scene.  In sum, the FCC through  this expansion
of CALEA will create mandatory  membranes for applications that are used
online.
135.  Id. at 36 n.123,  38.
136.  Id.  In many other places in its filing, DOJ makes  clear that it is seeking prelaunch
review of services  that it might interpret are subject  to CALEA obligations.  For example,
according  to DOJ,  "CALEA's purpose  [is]  to ensure  solutions are built in pre-deployment."
Id.  at 21.
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As  with  the  push  for  the  broadcast  flag,  the  push  for  extension  of
CALEA to the Internet (and for delegation of broad design discretion to law
enforcement)  is  being  echoed  worldwide.  The  Council  of  Europe's
Convention  on  Cybercrime  (signed  by  the  United  States  but  not  yet
ratified) 137 broadly  requires  service providers  to  provide  assistance  to  law
enforcement  for  lawful  interception  of all  electronic  communications.
1 38
Each  ratifier  of  the  Convention  is  required  to  "empower  its  competent
authorities"  to "compel"  service providers,  "within [their] existing  technical
capability,"  to  cooperate  and  assist  the  competent  authorities  in  the
interception  and  recording  of both  "traffic  data"'139 and  "content  data"  in
real time of communications transmitted by means of a computer system. 140
And service providers are to be obliged to "keep confidential the fact of and
any  information  about  the  execution  of any power  provided  for"  in  these
surveillance  provisions.' 41   These  are  broader  requirements  than  any
137.  The terms of the Convention required that it would enter into force only once  it had
been ratified by five countries,  at least three of which  were Member  States of the Council  of
Europe.  In  July  2004 the Convention  entered  into  force,  having been  ratified by Albania,
Croatia,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  and  Romania.  Sen.  Lugar's  Foreign  Relations
Committee held a mostly favorable hearing  on the Convention  in June 2004.  It is likely that
the U.S. will ratify the Convention  in 2005.  An optional  additional protocol  on hate speech
will likely  not  be ratified by the  U.S., and  indeed has  not yet (as of September  2005)  been
ratified  by  any countries.  See Convention  on  Cybercrime,  Nov.  23,  2001,  41  I.L.M.  282,
available  at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/HtmlU185.htm;  Additional  Protocol
to the  Convention on  Cybercrime,  Concerning  the  Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist  and
Xenophobic  Nature  Committed  Through  Computer  Systems,  Jan.  28,  2003,  available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htmll  89.htm.
138.  For text of the  treaty,  see Convention  on  Cybercrime, supra note  137.  Intellectual
property  and surveillance  concerns  often converge;  article  10.1  of the  Convention  includes
vague  language  suggesting  that  infringement  using  a  computer  system  should  be
criminalized:  "Each  Party  shall  adopt  such  legislative  and  other  measures  as  may  be
necessary  to  establish  as  criminal  offences  under  its  domestic  law  the  infringement  of
copyright..,  where such acts are committed willfully, on a commercial  scale  and by means
of a computer system."  Id.  art.  10, § 1.
139.  "'[T]raffic  data'  means any computer data relating to a communication  by means of
a  computer  system,  generated  by  a  computer system  that  formed  a  part  in  the  chain  of
communication,  indicating the  communication's  origin,  destination,  route,  time,  date,  size,
duration,  or type of underlying  service."  Id. art.  l(d).  "Content  data"  is  not defined  in the
Convention.  VeriSign,  in  its  comments  to  the  FCC  in  connection  with  the  CALEA
proceeding,  takes  the  position  that  the  CALEA  term  "call  identifying  information"  for
Internet  communications  should  be  taken  to  mean  "traffic  data"  as  defined  in  the
Convention, and that
[a]ll  object-to-object  communication  should  constitute  realtime  traffic  data,  not
content.  Only  humans  generate  "content."  Because  the  privacy  protections
accorded  to human  communications "content"  impose such  substantial  overheads,
complexities,  and costs on both providers and law enforcement  to implement  those
protections,  the  definition  of "content"  in  the  context  of  CALEA  should  be
narrowly construed.
Comments  of VeriSign,  Inc.  at  18,  Commc'ns  Assistance  for  Law  Enforcement  Act  &
Broadband  Access  &  Servs.,  ET No.  04-295  (FCC  Nov.  8,  2004)  [hereinafter  VeriSign
Comments],  available  at
https://67.15.34.213/dmirror/http/www.cdt.org/digi  tele/20041108verisign.pdf.
140.  See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 137,  arts. 20, 21.
141.  Id.  art. 21,  § 3.
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possible  reading  of CALEA  would  support,  as  CALEA  specifically  deals
with non-content data and does not gag service providers. 1 42
Through  the  domestic  CALEA/IP-enabled  services  proceeding  and  the
Council of Europe's  Convention on Cybercrime,  governments  are  working
towards  control  of an  unlimited  array  of Internet  services  in  the name  of
preventing  crime.  The  U.N.'s  International  Telecommunication  Union
("ITU")  has  blandly  predicted  that  such  controls  are  inevitable  for  the
Internet:
[A]s  the  Internet  transitions  to  a  [Next  Generation  Network  ("NGN")]
infrastructure, on which critical public  services  are layered, dependent on
differing  national  policy,  legislative  and  regulatory  environments,  there
will  also  [be]  a  consideration  of  similar  or  identical  rules  applied  to
services  offered  over current  circuit-switched  networks.  Such  examples
might include provisions for public safety needs, disability assistance, law
enforcement  support  (in  particular, legal  interception),  competition
considerations,  fraud  prevention,  prioritization  during  emergencies,
privacy  and  data protection,  and  consumer  protection  against unwanted
intrusions.  These  requirements  in  turn  assist  in  identification  of areas
likely to require  international standardization  activity. 1 43
The harmonization  between  the U.N.'s  language  and that of the FCC  in
its  IP-enabled  services  Notice  of Proposed  Rulemaking  is  unmistakable.
We are in for a drawn-out  global battle between the forces of centralization
and decentralization, between rigidity and openness.
The  FCC rulemakings  assessed  in  this Article  are  important  milestones
along  our  path:  They  involve  incremental  technical  mandates  and  pre-
approval  processes  affecting  the  Internet  that both reserve  in  the FCC  the
power  to  do  much  more  and  are  being  echoed  around  the  world.  In
particular,  the  U.N.  created  a  Working  Group  on  Internet  Governance
("WGIG")  that  issued  a  broad  report  in  June  2005.144  The  WGIG
considered  "whether there will be  international  regulation of such things as
spam,  fraud  and  content  that's  considered  inappropriate."' 1 45  The  WGIG
adopted  an extraordinarily broad Plan of Action,  a document  more than 20
142.  Indeed, the Convention  provisions dealing with interception of content data  was kept
secret until just before  the  deadline provided  by the  Council of Europe for  comments.  See
generally Yaman  Akdeniz,  Cyber-Rights  &  Cyber-Liberties:  An  Advocacy  Handbook  for
the  Non-Governmental  Organizations  (2003),  http://www.cyber-
rights.org/cybercrime/coe  handbook  crcl.pdf.
143.  U.N. Int'l  Telecomm.  Union, Council Working  Group on the World  Summit on the
Information  Society, Beyond Internet Governance,  at  11,  U.N. Doc WG-WSIS  7/13-E (Dec.
8,  2004),  available at http://www.itu.int/council/wsis/Geneva3  04/intgov-contribution-wg-
wsis.doc.  Indeed,  in VeriSign's  view,  "[t]he  implementation  of real-time  traffic  data  and
content production  requirements  under the Cybercrime  Convention  and numerous  MLATs
effected  for  law  enforcement,  critically  depends  on  global  standards  solutions  for  Next
Generation Networks,  including IP-Enabled  services and VoIP."  Verisign Comments, supra
note  139, at 24.
144.  Report  of  the  Working  Group  on  Internet  Governance  (June  2005),
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf.
145.  WSIS Participants  Struggle to Reach Internet Governance Consensus, Washington
Internet Daily, July 26, 2004, http://www.warren-news.com/internetservices.htm.
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pages  long,  addressing  issues  ranging  from  connectivity  for  small  rural
villages  to joint  prosecutions  of cybercrime,  from  "appropriate  action  on
spam" to e-health  initiatives.
There  is  a  deep  agenda  underneath  the  WGIG  efforts:  a  quest  to
"govern"  the  Internet  just  like  telecommunications  lines,  by  making  it
subject  to  imposed  membranes.  As  Markus  Kummer,  secretariat  of the
WGIG, makes clear,  "[t]here  are some  member  states within the U.N. that
would  like  to  think  the  Internet  itself is  a  communications  medium  that
should be  regulated  like  the  telecom  industry."'146 And there  are deep  ties
between the U.N.'s ITU, which is staffing the WGIG and would like to take
over  some of the Internet  Corporation  for Assigned  Names  and Number's
("ICANN") functions, 147 and  local  telecom  agencies, which  would  like to
have  control  over  new  turf  involving  Internet-specific  regulations. 148
Common  cause  has  been  easy  to  find  within  these  groups.  These  local
telecom agencies,  which are used to dealing with communications  media in
a  governmental  way,  may  be  looking  to  harmonize  "social  policy
standards"  for  content  worldwide. 149  "Social  policies"  may  themselves
signal  the  end  of decentralized  creation  of membranes,  by  prompting the
use  of routers  to  discriminate  against particular  kinds of content  (packets
containing VoIP or unauthorized  video), or requiring ISPs not to connect to
networks  deemed  to  be  places  where  unauthorized  content  is  routinely
available,  or  requiring  law  enforcement  pre-approval  for  new  Internet
services.
Part  IV makes  clear that the  FCC's jurisdictional  determinations should
not be deferred to as  a matter of law.  But the telecommunications,  content,
and law  enforcement  "industries"  are  not going to  give up on constraining
the information  flows of the  Internet,  the applications  that run over it,  and
the  devices  that  attach  to  it.  Reversals  by  courts  will  lead  only  towards
action on Capitol Hill, and it is there that the battle will be joined.
IV.  DOMESTIC LEGAL ANSWERS
If it is true (a) that recent actions of the FCC threaten the openness  of the
Internet and the  voluntariness  of the  information flow membranes  that  can
be  created  online,  and  (b)  that these actions  are being  echoed  in  different
ways  around  the  world,  what  should  be  done  about  this  state  of affairs?
146.  Interview  with Markus  Kummer, Head  Secretariat  of the  United Nations  Working
Group  on  Internet  Governance,  International  Telecommunication  Union,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/interview-with-united-nations-headsecretariat  of  wgig/
(last visited Oct. 23,  2005).
147.  ITU  Chiefs  Target ICANN  Turf, Computer  Bus.  Rev.  Online,  Dec.  20,  2004,
http://www.cbronline.com/article-news.asp?guid=7BB966AD-2017-4673-A034-
AA0083A2E492  (stating that the International  Telecommunication Union ("ITU") "has  been
working, mostly quietly, to get its hands on ICANN's responsibilities  over the domain name
system and IP address allocation for a number of years").
148.  ITU's  members  are  telecommunications  companies  and  nations.  See International
Telecommunication  Union,  Overview,  http://www.itu.int/GlobalDirectory/index.html  (last
visited Oct. 22,  2005).
149.  See Johnson et al., supra note 59.
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This part  examines possible domestic  legal  responses  to  the broadcast  flag
scheme  and  the  IP-enabled  services/CALEA  proceedings.  Both  the
broadcast  flag  and  IP-enabled  services  are  being  based  on  the  FCC's
"ancillary jurisdiction" under Title I of the Communications Act. 15 0  As this
part  will  demonstrate,  the  FCC's  arguments  in  these  two  rulemakings  in
support  of its  exercise  of jurisdiction  are weak,  and its  determinations  on
this score  should not be deferred to under the Chevron doctrine.  Similarly,
the  Commission's  statutory  argument  for  extension  of  CALEA  to  the
Internet  is fatally flawed.  All of this points towards referral  to Congress of
the policies and rules suggested  in these rulemakings.
A.  The Communications  Act and  Ancillary Jurisdiction
The FCC has stated that it is basing  its actions  in the broadcast  flag  and
IP-enabled services rulemakings  on its "ancillary"  jurisdiction under Title I
of the Communications  Act.  This section rebuts this argument.
The  general  purpose  of the  Communications  Act  of  1934  (amended  in
1996)  is  to  "make  available..,  to  all  the  people  of the  United  States,  a
rapid,  efficient,  nationwide,  and  worldwide  wire  and  communication
service  with adequate  facilities  at reasonable  charges."'151  The  Act  grants
regulatory  authority  to  the  FCC  over  three  specific  modes  of
communication  services:  (a) interstate  common  carriers under Title  II, (b)
spectrum licensees under Title III, and (c)  cable operators under Title VI.152
Because  manufacturers of consumer electronics  equipment and providers of
IP-enabled  services  are neither Title  II common carriers,  Title III  spectrum
licensees,  nor Title VI cable operators, the FCC looks back to Title I of the
Act-where  it  believes  its  interstitial  or  general-purpose  authority  is
found-to  support its jurisdiction over these entities.
Title  I  is  quite  general.  It  creates  the  FCC  "[f]or  the  purpose  of
regulating  interstate and  foreign  commerce  in communication  by wire and
radio,"  in  order to "make  available,  so  far as possible,  to all the  people  of
the  United  States,  without  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  race,  color,
religion,  national  origin,  or  sex,  a rapid, efficient,  Nationwide,  and world-
wide  wire  and  radio  communication  service  with  adequate  facilities  at
reasonable  charges."'
153
Section 2(a) of Title I states that
[t]he  provisions  of this  act  shall  apply  to  all  interstate  and  foreign
communication  by  wire  or  radio  and  all  interstate  and  foreign
transmission  of  energy  by  radio,  which  originates  and/or  is  received
within  the  United  States,  and  to  all  persons  engaged  within  the  United
States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio.
1 54
150.  47 U.S.C. §§  151-161  (2000).
151.  Id.  §  151.
152.  Id.  §§  201-276, 301-399(b),  401-416.
153.  Id.  §  151.
154.  Id. § 152(a).
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This section is about scope  of coverage-it intentionally  excludes people in
the  Canal  Zone,  for  example-and  says  nothing  about  rulemaking
authority.
5 5
Section  4  of Title  I is  a  lengthy  housekeeping  section  that  defines  the
membership  of the  FCC,  sets  forth  rules  about  reimbursement  of travel
expenses,  makes  policies  about  the  number  of  assistants  each
Commissioner  may  hire,  and  sets  rates  for  overtime  pay  of  field
engineers. 156  Deeply buried after  all of this text, the Act states in 4(i)  that
"[t]he  Commission  may  perform  any  and  all  acts,  make  such  rules  and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may
be  necessary  in  the  execution  of its  functions."'157  This  "necessary  and
proper"  section  seems  to  be  wholly  focused  on  internal  housekeeping,
allowing  the  Commission  to  make  rules  that  permit  it  to  operate
smoothly. 158   Indeed,  this  crucial  section  4(i)  arguably  allows  the
Commission  only  to  implement regulations  that  are necessary  to  carry out
its explicit  responsibilities under  the Communications Act,  and conveys  no
independent,  stand-alone  basis  for  legislative  rulemaking  authority  to  the
Commission.159  Most importantly,  section 4(i)  is not tied to any provisions
for  sanctions.  Reading  4(i) to  do more  than permit internal  housekeeping
would  render  the  rulemaking  provisions  found  in  Titles  II,  III,  and  VI
superfluous. 
60
155.  See Thomas G. Krattenmaker  & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority
over Commercial  Television  Networks:  The  Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction,  77 Nw.  U.  L.
Rev. 403, 404 (1982).
[Ilt  is unclear  how  the  Commission  may  regulate  [television]  network  behavior
even  under this expansive provision of the Act [section  2(a)], unless the provision
is  construed to give the FCC authority over everyone  in the United States who uses
wire  or  radio  electronic  communications  facilities,  such  as  by  talking  on  the
telephone.
Id.  at 405.
156.  47 U.S.C.  §  154.
157.  Id. § 154(i).
158.  See N. Am. Telecomm.  Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d  1282,  1292 (7th Cir. 1985)  (holding
that  §  154(i)  authorizes  the  FCC  to  adopt  rules  "to  the  extent  necessary  to  regulate
effectively those  matters  already  within  the  boundaries"  of the  Act);  AT&T  v. FCC,  487
F.2d 865,  872 (2d Cir.  1973)  (stating  that "Congress,  rather than  purporting  'to  transfer its
legislative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body,'  ...  intended a specific
statutory basis for the Commission's  authority"  (quoting FCC v. RCA Commc'ns,  Inc., 346
U.S. 86, 90 (1953))).
159.  Motion  Picture  Ass'n  of Am.  v. FCC,  309  F.3d  796,  806  (D.C. Cir.  2002);  New
England Power v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 467  F.2d 425,  430-31  (D.C. Cir. 1972)  ("Necessary
and  proper"  rulemaking  provisions  "merely  augment  existing  powers  conferred  on  the
agency  by  Congress,  they  do  not confer  independent  authority to  [regulate]."),  aff'd, 415
U.S. 345 (1974).
160.  Thomas  Merrill  and Kathryn Watts have made this  argument persuasively.  Thomas
W.  Merrill  & Kathryn Tongue  Watts, Agency  Rules with  the Force of Law:  The  Original
Convention,  116  Harv.  L.  Rev.  467,  517-19  (2002)  (stating  that  rulemaking  grants  not
coupled with any provision for sanctions should be understood to authorize only interpretive
and  procedural  rules.)  James  Speta  agrees  with  this  interpretation.  James  B.  Speta,  FCC
Authority to Regulate the Internet:  Creating It & Limiting It,  35  Loy. U. Chi.  L.J. 15 (2003).
However,  Philip  Weiser  advocates  for  a  broader,  "common-law"  use  of Title  I ancillary
authority to reach Internet-related services:
20051FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
In  the  context  of  both  the  flag  rule  and  the  IP-enabled  services
proceeding,  the FCC has pointed to the language of section 4(i) as giving it
broad "ancillary"  rulemaking jurisdiction to adopt the relevant  rule.  Indeed,
the  FCC  asserts  that unless  Congress  has  told  the  Commission  it  cannot
regulate,  it has  the power  to adopt  any  rules that "effectuate  the  goals"  of
the Communications Act. 161
It  is  true  that  Supreme  Court  decisions  of more  than  thirty  years  ago
interpreted the Communications  Act to grant the Commission the authority
to  regulate  cable  television  based  on  the  idea  that  such  regulation  was
"reasonably  ancillary"  to  the  Commission's  statutory  authority  over
broadcast  television. 162  The Commission  clearly  had the  power  to  issue
legislative  rules that regulated the  activities of broadcasters.  But when the
FCC  then  asserted  legislative  rulemaking  authority  over  the  operators  of
cable systems, it had not been delegated by Congress any power to regulate
these  actors.  The  Supreme  Court's decisions  to authorize the Commission
to  proceed  with  rules  affecting  cable  operators  have  been  labeled  by
Thomas  Merrill  as  "spectacular  breaches  of principle"  and as  examples  of
an  agency  using  legislative  powers  outside  the  area  of  its  delegated
jurisdiction. 163  The Commission  is now leaning heavily on these decisions,
and on this secondary  type of regulatory  rulemaking jurisdiction, which  is
not based  on any of the explicit rulemaking  authorities  granted in Titles  II,
III, or VI.
164
The 1968  case that made  ancillary jurisdiction  famous is  United  States v.
Southwestern Cable.165  The  case began  when Midwest Television  alleged
that  Southwestern  Cable  Company  was  cablecasting  Los  Angeles  stations
into the  San Diego  area, which was hurting the  local  San Diego broadcast
station.  The  FCC  had  initially  found  that  cable  systems  were  neither
common carriers nor broadcasters,  and  so FCC had no primary jurisdiction
over  them.  The  Commission  sought  Congressional  approval  of  its
jurisdiction  over cable,  but to no avail.  The  Commission then went  ahead
with making  rules for the  cable  industry,  and ordered  Southwestern  not to
Rather than mapping and adjusting the scope  of current policies  onto the Internet,
the  development  of a  new regime pursuant  to  Title I can  ensure that  the Internet
will prosper and compete with existing media without being encumbered by legacy
regulations  that may not be appropriate.
Philip J. Weiser, Toward  a Next Generation  Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U.  Chi. L.J. 41,  61
(2003).
161.  Brief for  Respondents,  supra note  71,  at 23,  25;  Digital  Broad.  Content  Prot.,  18
F.C.C.R.  23,550,  23,563  (2003)  (FCC  report,  order,  and  further  notice  of  proposed
rulemaking).
162.  United States v. Midwest  Video Corp.,  406  U.S. 649,  657-58  (1972);  United States
v. Sw.  Cable Co., 392 U.S.  157,  178 (1968).
163.  Merrill, supra  note  8, at 2169-70.
164..  Congress later  changed the  Communications  Act  to provide  for FCC regulation  of
cable systems. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521  (2000).
165.  392 U.S. at  178.
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expand  into  areas  where  it  had  not  been  cablecasting  before  February
1966.166
When Southwestern  Cable  appealed to  the Ninth  Circuit,  that court  held
that  the FCC  lacked jurisdiction  to  issue  such  an  order. 167  The Supreme
Court granted  certiorari  on  the question of the Commission's  authority  to
promulgate  rules  prohibiting  importation  of "distant  signals"  into the  San
Diego  television  market. 168  The Southwestern Cable Court found that the
FCC's  assertion  of  jurisdiction  was  appropriate,  holding  that  cable
television  was an  instrument of "'interstate  and foreign  communication  by
wire  or radio"'  within the meaning  of section  2(a) of the Communications
Act  of  1934.169  For  this  reason  the  Commission  was  held  to  have
"regulatory  authority"  over cable television. 17 0  However,  the Court chose
not  "to  determine  in  detail  the  limits  of the  Commission's  authority  to
regulate  [cable  television]"  under  section  2(a).171  Instead,  stressing  that
"'the achievement  of an agency's  ultimate purposes'  was at stake, 172  the
Court  noted  that  the  rules  were  "reasonably  ancillary  to  the  effective
performance  of the Commission's various responsibilities  for the regulation
of television  broadcasting."' 173  Thus,  even  though  no express  statute  had
been  passed  supporting  FCC's  power  over  cable  television,  the  Court
reasoned  that  because  Title  III  gave  the  Commission  authority  to  ensure
exclusive  broadcasting  areas  or  zones,  the  general  "wire  or radio"  statute
provided  statutory  authority  to  which  the  cable  authority  was "reasonably
ancillary."'
174
Following Southwestern Cable, the Court expanded the broad outlines of
"ancillary jursdiction" that had been created in that case.  In United  States v.
166.  The  purpose  of these  rules  was  to  prevent  division  of audiences  and  revenues
between  cable  television  and  fledgling  ultra  high  frequency  ("UHF")  and  educational
television  stations.  Competition  by  cable  operators,  the  Commission  feared,  would  make
these  new  ventures  unprofitable,  thereby  frustrating  the  Commission's  long-standing  and
congressionally  approved  policy  of  attempting  to  provide  locally  controlled  broadcast
television service. See id. at 175 & nn.41-42.
167.  Sw. Cable  Co. v. United  States, 378 F.2d  118  (9th  Cir.  1967), rev'd, 392 U.S.  157
(1968).
168.  Sw.  Cable Co., 392 U.S. at  159-60.
169.  Id. at  167-69 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).
170.  Id.  at  173.
171.  Id. at 178.
172.  Id. at  177 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.  747, 780 (1968)).
173.  Id. at  178.
174.  Id.  at  175,  178.  In  1976,  in  National Association  of  Regulatory  Utility
Commissioners v. FCC,  the D.C. Circuit interpreted  Southwestern Cable to be based on the
Commission's power to require such zone exclusivity:
The  Supreme  Court's  decision  [in  Southwestern  Cable]  to  define  F.C.C.
jurisdiction  over  cable  operators  in  terms  of  its  jurisdiction  over  television
broadcasting  emanated  from  a  finding  that the  two  operations  would  otherwise
conflict rather than  from a determination  that cable television  fit neatly within the
Communications Act provisions governing broadcasters.
533  F.2d 601,  621  (D.C.  Cir.  1976)  (Lumbard,  J.,  concurring).  In National Association of
Regulatory Commissioners, the  D.C.  Circuit  denied  the  FCC's  authority  to  preempt  state
regulation  of  two-way  non-video  communication  because  the  FCC  showed  insufficient
connection between its rules and the regulation of broadcasting. Id.  at 617.
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Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video /), 175  the FCC had promulgated  a rule
that cable systems  serving more than  3500 subscribers  had to provide  some
of their own  programming. 176  A  sharply  divided  Supreme  Court upheld
this rule under the FCC's ancillary authority, reasoning (again)  that section
2(a)  conferred  regulatory  power  on the  Commission. 177  Because  section
2(a) did  not  itself "prescribe  any  objectives  for which  the  Commission's
regulatory power over [cable television]  might properly be exercised,"  a test
was  needed  for  finding  whether  such  proper  objectives  existed. 178  The
Court  found  such  a  "test"  in  examining  whether  "long-established
regulatory  goals"  had been  met,  and  concluded  that  such  an  "origination
rule"  applied  to  cable  systems  would  "further  the  achievement  of long-
established  regulatory  goals  in  the  field  of  television  broadcasting  by
increasing  the  number  of  outlets  for  community  self-expression  and
augmenting  the public's  choice of programs  and types  of services ....  "179
The  Midwest  Video I  Court  concluded  that  "the  regulation  preserves  and
enhances  the  integrity  of broadcast  signals  and  therefore  is  'reasonably
ancillary  to  the  effective  performance  of  the  Commission's  various
responsibilities  for  the  regulation  of television  broadcasting."" 180   Under
this standard,  the  Commission  was held  to  be  authorized  to  require  cable
program  origination  since  such  a  requirement  furthered  Commission
policies  with  respect  to  both  enhancement  of  local  service  and
diversification of control of available television and cable programming. 181
Midwest  Video I thus  took a  giant step  beyond Southwestern Cable in
relaxing  the nature of the  "ancillariness"  necessary  to  support an  assertion
of Commission power.  Midwest Video I arguably turns on a determination
that  "ancillary  to  broadcasting"  means  not  only  "for  the  protection  of
broadcasting"  (as in Southwestern Cable) but also extends to any regulation
of cable  which  in its  own  right  serves  the  purposes  pursued  by broadcast
regulation.1
82
But the  Midwest Video I Court sustained  the  Commission's jurisdiction
to  issue  its regulations  by  only a  5-4 vote  and without  an opinion  for the
Court.  Chief  Justice  Warren  Burger  cast  the  deciding  vote,  and,  in  a
separate opinion,  wrote that "[c]andor  requires acknowledgment,  for me at
least,  that  the  Commission's  position  strains  the  outer  limits  of even  the
open-ended  and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by  decisions of the
Commission  and  the  courts." 183   Though  not  "fully  persuaded  that  the
175.  United States v. Midwest Video  Corp. (Midwest Video 1), 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
176.  Amendment  of Part  74,  Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations  Relative
to Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972)  (FCC report and order).
177.  Midwest Video 1, 406 U.S. at 661.
178.  Id.
179.  Id. at 667-68 (quoting Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations  Relative  to Cmty.  Antenna  Television  Sys.,  20  F.C.C.2d  201,  202  (1969)
(FCC first report and order)).
180.  Id. at 670 (quoting United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S.  157,  178  (1967)).
181.  See id.  at 668-70.
182.  Id. at 662-63.
183.  Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring  in the judgment).
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Commission ha[d]  made the correct decision  in [the] case,"  he was inclined
to defer to its judgment. 
184
In the  very  next  Supreme  Court  case  about  FCC  ancillary  jurisdiction,
FCC v.  Midwest  Video  Corp. (Midwest  Video I/),185  the  Court confirmed
that the "outer boundary"  of jurisdiction had been reached  in Southwestern
Cable and  Midwest  Video  I  and  that  the  FCC  had  to  be  reined  in.  In
Midwest  Video  II, the  FCC  had  created  rules  requiring  cable  television
systems  to  make  available  certain  channels  for  access  by  public,
educational,  local  governmental,  and  leased-access  users,  and  to  furnish
equipment  and  facilities  for  access  purposes. 186  Under  these  new  rules,
cable  operators were deprived of all discretion regarding who  could exploit
their access  channels and what could be  transmitted over such  channels. 187
Respondents  contended  that  the  regulations  were  not  only  qualitatively
different  from those  heretofore  approved by the  courts,  but that they  also
contravened  freedom of the press guarantees-particularly  the command of
the Communications  Act of 1934,  section 3(h), (contained  in the  definition
of "common carrier") that "a  person engaged in  ...  broadcasting  shall not
...  be deemed a common carrier."'188
The  Supreme  Court,  reversing  the  FCC,  found  that  the  FCC's  actions
amounted  to  regulating  cable  systems  as  common  carriers,  and  that
authority  for  such regulation  had  to  come  specifically  from  Congress. 189
"Though  afforded  wide  latitude  in  its  supervision over  communication  by
wire, the  Commission was not delegated unrestrained  authority."'19 0  Mere
"reasonable  relation"  to  Commission  desires  was  not  sufficient  to justify
ancillary jurisdiction. 1 91
More  recently,  the  FCC  argued  that  its  Title  I  ancillary  jurisdiction
justified  requiring  "video  descriptions"  for  television  programming, 192
184.  Id.  For  Chief  Justice  Burger,  the  decisive  factor  was  that  cable  systems  are
"dependent  totally  on  broadcast  signals."  Id. at  675.  By  "interrupt[ing]  the  signal  and
put[ting] it to their own use for profit, they take on burdens,  one of which is regulation by the
Commission."  Id.  at 676.  In both  the broadcast flag and IP-enabled  services  settings,  there
can be no argument that some "interruption  of signal" event has occurred.
185.  440 U.S. 689,  708-09 (1979)  (finding that rules requiring cable operators  to provide
equipment,  facilities,  and  channel  access  to  the  public  were  not reasonably  ancillary  to
FCC's regulation of broadcast and therefore  were outside FCC jurisdiction).
186.  See id. at 691-94.
187.  See id
188.  47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2000).
189.  Midwest Video 11,  440 U.S. at 708-09.
190.  Id. at 706.
191.  See id at 708-09.
192.  Implementation of Video  Description  of Video  Programming,  15  F.C.C.R.  15,230,
15,256-57 (2000) (FCC report and order adopting rules which mandated  a certain amount of
television programming with "video descriptions" per quarter).  Video  descriptions
provide aural  descriptions of a television  program's key  visual elements  (such  as
the  movement  of  a  person  in  a  scene)  that  are  inserted  during  pauses  in  the
program  dialogue.  Video  descriptions  change  program  content  because  they
require  the  creation  of new  script  to  convey  program  details,  whereas  closed
captions  present a verbatim transcription of the program's spoken words.
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798 (D.C.  Cir. 2002).
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noting  that  comments  it  had  received  demonstrated  "the  importance  of
video  description  to  persons  with  visual  disabilities."' 193   The  MPAA
objected and filed suit. 194  In a crisp opinion, the D.C.  Circuit reversed the
FCC's determination,  noting that Congress  had not explicitly  "authorize[d]
the  Commission  to adopt regulations  implementing  video descriptions."' 195
The  court rebuked  the  FCC for  its overuse  of Title I, saying,  "Contrary  to
the  FCC's arguments  suggesting  otherwise,  § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151,  does  not
give  the  FCC  unlimited  authority  to  act  as  it  sees  fit  with  respect  to  all
aspects  of television  transmissions,  without  regard  to  the  scope  of  the
proposed regulations."1
96
B.  Breadth ofFCC's  Ancillary Jurisdiction  Claim
The  FCC's  key jurisdictional  claim  in  both  the  broadcast  flag  and  IP-
enabled  services  rulemakings  is  that  the  Commission  has  regulatory
authority  over all interstate communication by wire or radio  and all devices,
facilities,  apparatus,  or anything else "associated  with the  overall circuit of
messages  sent and received" via wire  or radio.197  The FCC also appears  to
believe that it has had this power since  1934,  and has  simply chosen not to
exercise  it since then. 198
As outlined  above,  in the absence  of an express  statutory  delegation,  the
FCC  does  not have  legislative  rulemaking  authority  under Title I  over  all
wire  and  radio  communications  within  the  United  States  and  all  devices
concerning  these  communications.  In  both  the  broadcast  flag  and  IP-
enabled  services contexts,  Congress  has clearly  stated that  it does not want
the FCC to  have the power to make  detailed  rules about  either (1) devices
that receive digital files or (2)  the Internet generally.199
Specifically,  in  the  All  Channel  Receiver  Act  ("ACRA"),  Congress
granted the FCC constrained  authority to ensure that television sets receive
all  channels  but  withheld  the  broader  power  over  television  sets  and
"downstream  devices"  that  the  Commission  would  now  like  to  have.200
193.  Implementation of Video Description, 15 F.C.C.R. at  15,232.
194.  Motion Picture  Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 796.
195.  Id.  at 798.  The  D.C. Circuit also refused to accord Chevron deference to the FCC's
determination  of its  powers,  saying  that  the  Commission  had  "acted  without  delegated
authority from Congress" and thus Chevron was inapplicable. Id.  at 807.
196.  Id.  at 798.
197.  Brief for  Respondents, supra note 71, at  17 (FCC response  to the American Library
Association's  challenge  to  its jurisdiction  to  adopt  the  broadcast  flag  rule);  see also  IP-
Enabled  Services,  19  F.C.C.R.  4863,  4895  (2004)  (FCC  notice  of proposed  rulemaking)
("Title I of the Act confers  upon the Commission ancillary jurisdiction over matters that are
not expressly  within the  scope of a specific  statutory mandate  but nevertheless  necessary to
the Commission's execution of its statutorily prescribed  functions.").
198.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 71,  at 25.
199.  See supra Part II.
200.  See 47  U.S.C. § 303(s) (2000).  Originally, the All  Channel  Receiver Act ("ACRA")
would  have  given  the  FCC  broad  authority  to  set  performance  standards  for  television
receivers.  See S.  Rep. No.  87-1526  (1962),  as reprinted  in 1962  U.S.C.C.A.N.  1873,  1879.
But the draft bill was  sharply questioned for the role it allowed the FCC  in receiver design.
Id.  Congressman  Kenneth  Roberts  stated that  "'[t]he  FCC  should  not  have  the power  to
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Other than  in the  broadcast  flag proceeding,  the  FCC  has  not  in  the  past
ordered  non-common-carrier  manufacturers  to  change  the  design  of their
products  in  the  absence  of a  statute  specifically  granting  the  Commission
authority  to make such demands.  Instead, the FCC  has been careful not to
implicitly require that particular forms of technology be installed.  There are
specific  statutes  authorizing  the  FCC  to  make  rules  about  harmful
interference  from  radiating  devices,201  about  closed-captioning  decoder
circuitry (but not about specifications  for such  circuitry),20 2 and about the
V-Chip (but not about specifications for the V-Chip).20 3
In January 2004, a coalition of library associations  and consumer groups
sued  the  FCC  in  the  D.C.  Circuit,  challenging  the  Commission's
jurisdiction  to  adopt  the  broadcast  flag  rule. 2 0 4  In  May  2005,  the  D.C.
Circuit agreed that the FCC did not have jurisdiction  over the post-receipt-
of-signal  operation of devices,  and struck down the broadcast flag rule. 205
As  for  the  IP-enabled  services  proceeding,  every  one  of  the  "social
policies"  proposed by  the  FCC  is something  that  has been imposed  in  the
past  on  telecommunications  services  providers--on  common  carriers. 2 0 6
The  Commission  lacks  any  statutory  authority  to  impose these policies  on
require  that all  sets be color  sets, or have a  certain  size of picture  tube  or be made with  a
certain  size  speaker  and so forth."'  Elec. Indus. Ass'n.  Consumer Elec.  Group  v. FCC,  636
F.2d  689,  694  (D.C. Cir.  1980)  (quoting All-Channel Television Receivers:  Hearing on S.
2109 before the Subcomm. on Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 87th  Cong.
59  (1962)  (statement of Rep.  Kenneth A. Roberts)).  Congress decided to "carefully  limit[]"
the FCC's authority only to ensure that televisions  "adequately receiv[e]  all frequencies."  Id.
at  692,  696.  In  August  2002,  the  FCC  issued  its  Digital  Tuner  Order  using  ACRA  as
authority,  directing that, on a phased-in basis starting in July 2004, all televisions sold in the
United  States  must  contain  a  digital  tuner.  Review  of  the  Comm'n's  Rules  &  Policies
Affecting  the Conversion  to Digital  Television,  17  F.C.C.R. 15,978,  15,996 (2002) (holding
that ACRA  had expressly devolved  to the FCC the power to require that televisions sold  in
the U.S.  "be capable of adequately  receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to
television  broadcasting").  In  late  October  2003,  the  D.C.  Circuit  upheld  the  FCC's
jurisdiction  to enter  the Digital  Tuner  Order,  citing  specifically  FCC's  reliance on  ACRA.
Consumer Elecs. Ass'n  v. FCC,  347 F.3d 291  (D.C. Cir. 2003).  This case  strongly supports
the notion that  the FCC requires  a statutory  mandate in order to require non-common-carrier
manufacturers to modify their devices.
201.  47 U.S.C.  § 302.
202.  S.  Rep. No.  101-393, at 9 (1990),  as reprinted  in 1990  U.S.C.C.A.N.  1438,  1446.
203.  See  47  U.S.C.  §§  303(x),  330(c).  Again,  these  provisions  of the  act  were  not
technology-specific,  and  authorized  the  FCC  only  to  require  manufacturers  to  equip
televisions  with "a feature designed to enable  viewers to block display of programs carrying
a common rating."  H.R. Rep. No.  104-458,  at 196 (1996)  (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted  in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N.  10,  210.  In  doing  so,  Congress  instructed  the  FCC  to  preserve  for
manufacturers  the  option  of using  "alternative  technology  that  meets  certain  standards  of
cost, effectiveness  and ease of  use."  Id.
204.  Susan P. Crawford,  The Biology of the Broadcast Flag,  25  Hastings  Comm. &  Ent.
L.J. 603 (2003).
205.  See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
206.  "The  Commission  has  concluded,  and  courts  have  agreed,  that  the
'telecommunications  service'  definition [found in the Communications Act]  was 'intended to
clarify  that  telecommunications  services  are  common carrier  services."'  IP-Enabled  Servs.,
19  F.C.C.R. 4863,  4880-81  (2004)  (FCC notice  of proposed rulemaking)  (quoting Cable  &
Wireless, PLC,  12  F.C.C.R. 8516, 8521 (1997)  (FCC cable landing license order)).
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non-common  carriers.  Indeed,  Congress,  in  Section  509  of the  same
Communications  Act,  which  the  FCC  is  charged  with  administering,
explicitly  elected  not  to impose common  carrier obligations  on  interactive
computer services,20 7 as described in Part I above.
C.  Extension of CALLA  to the Internet  Is a Statutory Impossibility
Perhaps aware  that  its "ancillary  jurisdiction"  claims  were  insufficiently
strong  to withstand litigation  in the broadcast  flag and IP-enabled  services
settings,  the  Commission  has  not  relied  on  this  theory  in  the  CALEA
context.  Instead, the FCC has used  a novel  reading of the  CALEA statute
to  support  its  argument  that CALEA  should  be  extended  to the  Internet.
CALEA  states  that  the  term  "telecommunications  carrier"  (the  entities
covered by CALEA) includes  "a person or entity engaged in providing wire
or electronic communication  switching  or transmission service  to the extent
that  the  Commission  finds  that  such  service  is  a  replacement  for  a
substantial  portion  of  the  local  telephone  exchange  service  ....  208
CALEA then excludes  from the definition of "telecommunications  carrier"
all  "information  services." 209   The  Commission  has  interpreted  the
"substantial  replacement"  language  of CALEA  to  cover  both  provision of
any  kind of broadband  Internet  access  service  and  "interconnected"  VoIP
services,210  and  has  ignored  the  overarching  "information  services"
exclusion-effectively  reading this exclusion out of the statute.
As  discussed  above,  CALEA  was  a  narrowly  drawn  statute  focused
carefully  (after  much negotiation)  on  the traditional telephone  system,  and
the  "information  services"  exclusion  from  the  scope  of  CALLA  was
intended  to be broadly  read.  The  Commission has  no  authority  to  redraw
the  outlines  of CALEA's  application  to  include  either  Internet  access  or
Internet applications.  Only Congress can take this step.211
V.  INFORMATION FLOWS AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Once we  are  back  in  Congress  to  talk  about  regulating  the  Internet  in
order  to  assist  law  enforcement,  the  content  industry,  and  incumbent
207.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
208.  Id. § 1001(8)(B)(ii).
209.  Id. § 1001(8)(C)(i).
210.  Communications  Assistance  for Law Enforcement  Act,  69 Fed. Reg. 56,976, 56,798
(Sept. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. §§  22, 24,  64).
211.  The  Commission's  belief  in  its  "unregulation"  agenda  for  IP-enabled  services
received  substantial  support  in  the  Supreme  Court's  recent  opinion  in  National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand  X lnternet Services, 125  S.Ct. 2688  (2005).  The
Court  said  in  dicta  that  although  "information-service  providers  . . . are  not  subject  to
mandatory  common-carrier regulation under Title  II ...  the Commission  has jurisdiction  to
impose  additional  regulatory  obligations  under  its  Title  I  ancillary  jurisdiction,"  and
indicated that policy  in this "technical  and complex"  area should be set by the  Commission
(and thus impliedly not by the courts or Congress). Id. at 2696, 2705.  The BrandX  opinion
can  fairly  be read  to  give  the  Commission  complete  discretion  over what  rules  should be
mandated  with respect to "information  services"  (including  the Internet),  even if those  rules
are the same  as rules applied to common carriers.
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telephone companies, what should we say?  It is not enough simply to claim
that  "the  Internet  is  different"  and  that  therefore  Congress  should  keep
away.
This  part  presents  the  claim  that  the  Internet  is  a  complex  system.
Insofar  as  governments  care  (as  they  should)  about  the  benefits  of the
information  flows made  possible online,  the complexities  of these existing
membranes  will  defeat  large-scale  governmental  intervention.  The  best
way  to  proceed  is  to  facilitate  the  evolution  of  complex  small-scale
regulatory mechanisms that themselves provide social order.
A.  The Internet as Complex Environment
The  Internet  is  itself a  complex  system,  made  up  of many  interacting
agents  (including  many  non-state  communities)  whose  dynamic
engagements  produce  elaborate  permeable  membranes  regulating
information  flow.212  Complex  adaptive  systems,  such  as  the  Internet,
economies,  weather,  and social  organizations,  are based  on  the actions  of
autonomous  agents  that  act  to  maximize  their  "fitness"  (or  success  as
measured  against  a  particular  landscape)  over  time.  These  agents  also
communicate  with  their neighbors.  This structure  produces responses  that
are neither predictable  nor linear.  Interactions  among  these  agents  lead to
emergent properties  of the system-properties  that  could not  be explained
by  traditional  analysis-that  are  not  properties  of the  agents  themselves.
And  the  actions  of these  agents  distort or  deform  the  "fitness  landscape"
that provides the system's environment,  making  it a very  rugged landscape
indeed.  Two key concepts will help us think about the Internet's particular
complexities:  "scale"  and "patching."
1.  Scale
Complex  systems are  more  or  less complex  at different  scales.  Indeed,
every complex  system is a tradeoff of complexity  at one  scale  (e.g.,  lots of
complexity  at  a  fine  scale,  with  actions  at  that  scale  characterized  by
independence  and randomness)  in  exchange for  less complexity  at another
scale  (e.g.,  little  complexity  at  a  higher  scale  but  greater  ability  to  act
coherently  and interdependently).  An ancient army was fairly complex at a
large  scale-but only because all of its soldiers had little autonomy at a fine
scale.  In  contrast,  an  unruly  mob  is  complex  at  a  small  scale.  Every
member of a mob can do whatever he wants.  But collectively,  mobs cannot
do anything very complex-they can storm a castle, but cannot organize the
resources inside the castle very effectively.
The environments  of complex  systems  are also  complex.  For example,
from the perspective of a rabbit, his environment is itself a complex system,
full  of  autonomous  agents  (other  animals,  barriers)  and  interdependence
(predator-prey  relationships,  food  availability).  Both  systems  and
212.  See  generally  Albert-Laszlo  Barabasi,  Linked:  The  New  Science  of  Networks
(2002).
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environments  are complex  systems with tradeoffs in complexity  at different
scales.
We  know  that  the  collective  complexity  of  a  traditional  hierarchical
organization-the  number of  possible  states  that  an  organization  can  be
in-can never exceed  the  complexity  of the  individual  at the  very  top.213
That person  has  limited bandwidth;  literally,  he  can only  take  in  and give
out a finite amount of information.  The problem is that  the environment  of
an  organization  may  become  more  complex  than  the  complexity  of the
individual  at the  top  of the  organization's  hierarchy.  When that happens,
when  there  is  a mismatch between  the complexity  of an organization  and
the  complexity  of the  organization's  environment,  the  organization  will
(over time) fail.  The organization will now be in an environment  that is too
complex for it to exist.
Similarly,  because  centralized  control  attempts  for  any  moderately
complex environment  are  likely to be  less  complex than that environment,
they  are likely to fail.  Think of the food supply for New York City.  What
if  someone  decided  that  having  seventy  sources  of  mushrooms  was
inefficient  because  some  people  were  unable  to  have  access  to  all  the
varieties  of mushrooms  they  wanted,  and  others  had  mushrooms  on  hand
that they did not need?  That same person could institute a centrally planned
system  that would take  careful  account of what everyone needed  and what
was  available,  and  would  ensure  that  very  large  quantities of inexpensive
(but high quality) mushrooms would be made available by a single supplier
to  restaurants  all  over the  city.  The  same person,  or bureau,  would make
decisions about fish and arugula and soy sauce and  everything else the city
needed.  All  fair  prices,  all  planned  to  the  smallest  detail.  What  would
happen?
We would have shortages and long lines all over the city.  This is, indeed,
what  happened  to  the  Soviet  central  planners,  whose  multiple  five-year
plans  resulted  in  economic  stagnation.214  The  Russian  system  could not
adapt  to  the  many  changes  in  its  environment.  Central  planning  of  a
complex system, with its many inputs and interdependencies,  will not work,
and will  be  particularly  unsuccessful  when  the  system  is  operating  in  an
uncertain environment whose complexity  exceeds that of the system.
Just as there needs to be a  mapping between the complexity of a system
and  the  complexity  of  its  environment,  complexity  at  different  scales
becomes  a  crucial  consideration  for  system/environment  interactions.
Systems  that operate  at  a large  scale will defeat  small  scale  environmental
213.  Yaneer  Bar-Yam,  Multiscale Variety in  Complex Systems,  Complexity,  Mar.-Apr.
2004, at 37.
214.  Mikhail  Gorbachev, Perestroika  17-19 (1987).
Analyzing the  situation, we  first discovered a  slowing  economic  growth  ...  to a
level  close to economic stagnation  ....  A country  that was once quickly closing
on the world's  advanced  nations  began  to lose  one position after another...  [in]
scientific  and  technological  development,  [and  in]  the  production  of advanced
technology.
Id. at  19.
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complexity  if these  two  systems  are  able  to  meet.  Thus,  for example,  if
there  are no other impediments  an elephant can flatten  a person and a tank
can flatten  a forest.  But if a large-scale system  is confronted with barriers
to  its  operation,  it  will  be  defeated  by  small-scale  complexity.  So,  for
example, if a tank wanted to move through  a forest to get to the next town,
but the tank manager was  concerned about the health of the forest  and was
reluctant  to  knock  down  individual  trees,  the  tank's  large-scale  motions
would be frustrated by the small-scale complexity of its environment.
The U.S. experience  in Iraq  is  illustrative:  The U.S.  army was perfectly
good  at  marching  into  ("flattening")  Baghdad,  but  the  post-intervention
maintenance  of  order  in  Iraq-which  requires  enormously  complex
interactions with people whom we have  no interest  in flattening-has been
beyond  the  capabilities  of the  forces  that  are  on  the  ground  there.  By
contrast,  the  U.S.  campaign  in  Afghanistan  (which  used  autonomous
Special Forces troops to deal with the complex situation on the ground) was
relatively successful.  Large-scale, simple moves by a particular system will
be defeated by  the  complexity of that system's  environment  if the two are
unable to engage,  for whatever reason.
When  one  thinks  of the  Internet  as  a  complex  system/environment  in
which  government  is  attempting  to  operate,  the  problem  becomes  clear.
The Internet is like the terrain on which a battle is being played out, and it is
an extraordinarily  complex landscape.  There are many many possible  states
of information  flows and membranes online, and more are developing every
day.  Otherwise  stated,  the  number  of  possibilities  for  the  states  of
information  flows  online-the  online  environment's  complexity-is  very
high  indeed.  But  governments,  as  rulemakers,  are  usually  rigidly
hierarchical.  Thus,  their organizational  ability to make decisions  is only  as
complex as the bandwidth of the person at the top of the relevant hierarchy.
Again,  where  the  complexity  of a  system  (government)  is  insufficient  to
cope with the complexity  of its environment  (the Internet), the system will
be unsuccessful.
Let us assume that governments plan to mandate large-scale  information
flow  membranes  for  the  Internet  ("this  unlawful  bit  shall  not  pass  this
technical  barrier").  What  will happen?  There  are  two  answers.  First,  if
governments  act  on  a  very  large  scale,  they  can  simply  defeat  the
complexity  of  information  flows  online.  The  online  world  provides
opportunities  for governmental  informational  control that have  never been
available offline.  Code is very difficult for an average citizen to disobey.  If
all  the  devices  that connect  to  the  Internet  are constrained  by  government
mandate,  and all  applications  are  monitored  by  governmental  authorities,
there  will  be  no  opportunities  for the  creation  of private  membranes  that
permit the further explosive  evolution of social and cultural life online.  The
mandated  membrane  (the  tank)  can flatten  the  membranes  that now  exist
(the forest).  Indeed,  China has on  a  large scale  taken  on exactly this task,
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by creating a border-membrane  through which all  Internet communications
must flow.
215
The second  answer  is that although  large  scale  operations  can  certainly
defeat  complexity  when  the  large-scale  system  is  able  to  operate,  the
complexity  of the  Internet's  existing  information  flow  structures  (many
elements  of  which  governments  will  want  to  retain  for  their  positive
benefits)  will  ultimately  make  it  impossible  for  governments  to  act
successfully in establishing their own membranes-particularly  if they have
any  concerns  at  all  about  downstream  effects.  The  complexities  of the
Internet's  existing  information  flow  structures  produce  many  positive
benefits  for governments.  Among many  other things, economic  growth-
including  increased  productivity,  creation  of jobs,  and  higher  wages-is
spurred  by  Internet  connectivity  and  the  creation  of  membranes  across
physical,  geographical  borders.  The  Internet  is  not  (just)  a  sea  of
pornography;  it makes  it possible  for tiny businesses  in remote  villages  to
sell  their  wares  and  learn  about  space  travel.  There  are,  in  fact,  many
positive  affordances  of the  Internet  that  are  created  by the  availability  of
decentralized  information-flow  management.  Flattening  the complexity  of
the Internet's information-flow  membranes  may have complex  downstream
effects  that  are  impossible  to  predict  and  are  not ultimately  beneficial  to
governments.
216
In  other  words,  scale  can  win  out  over  complexity  only  if they  can
encounter  each  other.  Because  no  government  will  want  to  completely
flatten the  Internet's  non-state membrane  structure,  efforts  to constrain  the
information  flows  of the Internet  by  centralized  means will  ultimately be
frustrated by the complexity of information flows online.
215.  Jonathan Zittrain  &  Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering  in China, IEEE  Internet
Computing, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 70, available  at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/.
216.  Applying  large-scale  "fixes"  to  online  information  flow  membranes  is  roughly
similar  to sending a  medication  into  the complex  system that is the  human body.  Medical
researchers  know  that drugs  work  by  binding  to  a  protein,  and usually  by  inhibiting  the
actions of that protein.  Many in the past believed that one could change the human  body by
targeting a single protein  and causing cells to move from one state-e.g., death-to another
(e.g.,  proliferation).  It turns out, however, that proteins targeted for blocking  are themselves
part  of  a network  of communicating  proteins.  So,  for  example,  Vioxx  inhibits  a  protein
called  COX-2,  which  causes pain.  But,  downstream, COX-2  supports vasoconstriction  and
decreases  the  risk of heart  attacks.  So  Vioxx  is  a double-edged  sword,  and has had  to be
withdrawn  from  the market. Marc  Kaufman, Merck  Withdraws Arthritis Medication, Wash.
Post,  Oct.  1,  2004,  at  Al,  available  at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A63157-2004Sep30.html.  Similarly,  large-scale  membranes  designed  to
"inhibit"  one kind of information  flow online  will inevitably  have  unpredictable, amplified,
and  possibly conflicting  effects  down the  road.  The  recent  case  Center  for Democracy &
Technology v. Pappert,  337 F.  Supp.  2d 606 (E.D. Pa, 2004), in which a Pennsylvania  state
statute  instructing  ISPs  to  block child  pornography  sites  resulted  in  the  blocking  of more
than a million innocent and lawful sites, illustrates the risks of large-scale  online information
flow  membrane  management.  See  Grant  Gross,  Court Rules Against State  Web-Blocking
Law,  PC  World,  Sept.  10,  2004,  at  10,  available  at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,  117740,00.asp.
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2.  Patching
In  an  environment  full  of conflict  and  nonlinear  dynamic  change,  it  is
very  difficult  for a  complex  system  to "find"  the  global,  overall  optimum
for the system as a whole.  There  are  simply too many choices  to make and
too much wasted time  spent wandering the landscape.  Systems  attempting
to find compromises  that will be best for all their actors will often get stuck
on metaphorically  "low"  hills.  Like  a  drop of water  or a  ball,  they  stop
searching  for  anything  "better"  once  they  stop  rolling,  because  any  other
step against their dynamic, unpredictable  landscape  may lead suddenly to  a
destabilizing  avalanche.  The  system,  in  Stuart  Kauffman's  words,  is
"caught in a web of conflicting constraints" in which "each small part of the
system affects other parts of the whole system,  [and]  changing  [the state  of
a  single  element]  will  have  effects  that  ripple  throughout  the system."217
The risk of acting in ways that will be harmful  is great.
How could management  do better?  It turns out that they can do better by
diversifying.  As  David  G.  Post  and  David  R.  Johnson  have  explained
(drawing  on  the  work of Stuart  Kauffman),218 when  systems  are  divided
into patches and agents'  actions  are measured and responded to with respect
to  their effect on the aggregate  fitness of their respective  patch (rather than
on  the  system  as  a  whole),  the  system  as  a  whole  will  find its  way  more
efficiently  towards  an  optimum  position.219  In  effect,  permitting  selfish
patches  to  act  in  their  own  self-interest  permits  the  system  to  "fail"
temporarily-to move  to a lower point on the fitness  landscape, which then
allows  ascent to a higher peak after further moves.  Post and Johnson have
also  shown that there  is a level of spillover  effect, or mapping between the
welfare of a particular patch  and its effect  on  outsiders,  which will lead to
more  optimal  overall  results.  They  called  this  measure  of  spillover
''congruence."
Thus,  deferring  to every  individual  membrane  would not  lead  to social
order.  Deferring to  a single authoritative  source of membranes  would lead
to  a  frozen,  lifeless  tundra.  Stuart Kauffman,  as  interpreted  by  Post  and
Johnson,  has shown  us that  having  a  single  source  of membranes  in  this
conflict-ridden  online landscape would not lead to the best results.  Indeed,
such  a single patch would inevitably freeze  in its tracks on a foothill in the
fitness  environment.  For  optimal  results,  complex  systems  should  be
divided into competing, co-evolving (and sometimes selfish) patches.  From
the Internet perspective,  one  can think  of these patches  as sets  of rules (or
membranes) permitting particular information flows.
Congress  should  restrain  itself in the  name  of evolution by  listening  to
the  same  intuitions  that  gave  us  the  healthy,  thriving  Internet  we  have
217.  Stuart  Kauffman,  At  Home  in  the  Universe:  The  Search  for  Laws  of  Self-
Organization and Complexity  173 (1995).
218.  David  G.  Post  &  David  R.  Johnson,  "Chaos Prevailing on  Every  Continent":
Towards a  New  Theory  of Decentralized Decision-Making in  Complex Systems,  73  Chi.-
Kent  L. Rev.  1055 (1998).
219.  Id. at  1059-60.
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today.  Congress  should  recognize  the  scaling  issues  that  will  make
intervention difficult,  and permit the  "patching"  of rules by facilitating  the
continued development of private information  flow membranes online.
CONCLUSION:  THE MESSY GLOBAL LANDSCAPE
Internet  governance  is,  in  reality,  focused  on  regulating  information
flows  and  not  at  all  with  traditional  "governance"  of  behavior  by
governments.  These  information  flows,  in  turn,  are  occurring  within  a
complex  environment-the  Internet-whose  dynamics  are  nonlinear  and
unpredictable.  If information  flows  are the subject of Internet governance,
how should they be governed?
We know that most large  top-down engineering projects fail because they
are simply  too complex,  and that centralized  approaches  to these  projects
will  not  work.220  We  also  know  that  large-scale,  simple  approaches  to
complex  environments  will  fail  if their  ability  to  operate  is  frustrated;
online,  because  there  are  many  information-flow  membranes  that  are
valuable  to  governments,  large-scale  governance  efforts  will  never
succeed. 221   Finally,  we  know  that  evolution  produces  contextual
"solutions"  to  these  hard  engineering  problems.222   We  thus  have  two
choices:  to avoid  altogether  the  complex task of working  on  information
flows,  or  to  allow  "better"  membranes  to  emerge  through  evolution.
Because  governments  will  not be content with  simply leaving  information
flows  alone,  they  will  need  evolutionary  guidance  to  encourage  the
development of highly evolved membranes.
The great choice  we face  at this moment  in the history of the Internet is
that  there  are  very  powerful  forces  at  work-law  enforcement,
telecommunications  companies,  and the  content industry-who  would like
to  see  mandated  membranes  and  gateways  of all  kinds  erected  to  block
particular bits  online.  These  industries  are  demanding  exactly the  kind of
large-scale,  tank-flattening-the-forest  kinds  of  initiatives  that  pose  great
risks to the future of online life because they will stifle continued  evolution.
We need to  point out to  legislative bodies  that online  life is already  highly
structured.  Patches  abound.  Non-state groups  are arising that are  creating
their own membranes  for information  flows, and there is  a real marketplace
220.  Yaneer  Bar-Yam,  When  Systems  Engineering  Fails-Toward  Complex  Systems
Engineering,  http://necsi.org/projects/yaneer/E3-IEEE  final.pdf (last  visited  Oct. 23,  2005).
A  1995  study  by  the  Standish  Group  showed  that  an  astounding  30%  of  large  U.S.
engineering  projects  were  scrapped,  50%  went  nearly  200%  over  cost,  and  20%  were
"challenged"-fraught  with  difficulties.  The  Standish  Group,  Chaos  (1995),  available at
http://wwwbroy.in.tum.de/lehre/vorlesungen/vse/WS2004/1995_StandishChaos.pdf.
221.  See supra  Part I.
222.  Bar-Yam, supra note  220; see Barbara A.  Cherry,  Office of Strategic  Planning  and
Policy  Analysis,  Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm.,  The  Telecommunications  Economy  and
Regulation  as  Coevolving  Complex  Adaptive  Systems:  Implications  for  Federalism,
available at  http://quello.msu.edu/complexity/CherryTPRC04.pdf  (last  visited  Oct.  23,
2005);  J.B.  Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental  Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev.  933
(1997).
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of  ideas  online  that  allows  these  groups  to  act  as  civic  organizations. 223
Vast  numbers  of people  are  online  and  are  participating  in  evolving  and
value-creating  information  exchanges  of  all  kinds.  (Indeed,  one  of  the
primary  engines  behind  calls  for  Internet  governance  is  not  a  quest  for
governance  at all, but rather the desire of developing nations to be online at
lower costs than  are currently permitted by global settlement regimes.)  The
online world is no longer the Wild West and may never have been.
It  is  true  that  there  are  forces  of informational  destabilization  that  are
perceived to  be at work.  Spain  is often cited  as one of these  forces;  some
people will say that email has become useless because of the  seething flood
of  unwanted  messages  being  propagated  across  the  Internet.  Security
threats generally  are viewed as enormous problems online, with viruses and
hacking attacks becoming central  concerns of businesses  and governments.
Terrorists are using the Internet to plan their attacks  (just as they would use
any  method  of  communication  available  to  them),  and  law  enforcement
agencies  would like the power to be able to listen in easily and to retain all
possible  communications  among  the  bad  guys.  Fraud  is  viewed  as  a
problem that is more prevalent online than offline.  Peer-to-peer file trading
is  also  viewed  as  destabilizing,  particularly  to  a content  industry  that has
heretofore been able to control distribution windows for its works.
Each of these incrementally destabilizing  phenomena  is viewed by some
to  be  capable  of causing  an  electronic  natural  disaster-an  avalanche  of
bits.  We  know  from  complexity  theory,  however,  that  the  risk  of an
avalanche  is  one  we  have  to  take  in  order  to  obtain  the  benefits  of  a
dynamic,  communicating, evolving, optimal system.  We also know that we
are  more  likely  to  get  that  optimal  system if we  allow  communities  and
groups of all kinds to build their own patch membranes.  This is, in a sense,
the lesson of federalism,  and federalism that includes a role for online non-
state communities is what is needed  for the  Internet.  The harmonized  rule
of  law,  in  this  bit-based  setting,  is  not  as  important  as  respect  for  the
cultures and societies that are emerging online.
If we  allow  a  diverse  set  of communities  to adopt  their  own  rules  and
make their own  decisions  about  their own  two-way membranes  (allowing
and blocking  flows  of information),  we  will  facilitate  the  co-evolution  of
patches  toward  a  better  overall  result.  Central  planning  regarding  the
permeability  of  information  membranes-whether  replication  or
amplification  of bits is permitted  across  a particular boundary--can  never
work as well.  The only available strategy to create  a good society has been
to  allow  valuable membranes  to evolve.  These  membranes  include  civic
groups,  innovative  economic  action,  constructive  social  collaboration,  and
many  other things  that make  up civic  life.  Because  the  nature,  intensity,
and  content  of  information  flows  online  will  continue  to  change,  and
because the desires of individuals  and the nature of the groups they join will
223.  Noveck,  supra note 24,  at 5 ("We should explore ways  to structure  the law so as to
circumscribe  malevolent  groups  while  deferring  political  and  legal  decisionmaking  to
decentralized  group-based  decisionmaking.").
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continue to evolve, we need to be friendly to conditions  that permit optimal
flexibility  and  facilitate  evolution  of  permeable  information-flow
membranes.  We  may  experience  some  temporary  avalanches  along  the
way,  but the membranes  that emerge  will evolve to  fit  the landscape.  We
will never be  stuck.
Somehow,  the perception that the Internet is a machine constructed out of
tangible hardware and  binary software  code has  led to a view that it can be
regulated  by  a machine.  But the  real  Internet,  the  one  that  matters,  is  as
interesting as  society  itself.  It could no more be  governed by a  centralized
authority than could a good conversation.  In a larger sense, we clearly still
need governments  to prohibit (offline)  murder.  But the targeted regulation
of the bad behavior of bad actors  is a kind of activity that  is  very different
from efforts  to control where  bits flow.  We have never willingly looked to
governments  to control  information  flows, because decentralized  actions by
diverse individuals and groups  are clearly much better suited to take on this
highly complex task.
Once we understand the  importance  of membranes  and the  impossibility
of designing them in advance, the desirability of facilitating evolution as the
key  global  legal  and  political  goal  for  Internet  governance  is  clear.
Information  flow  membranes  will  get  "better"  by  co-evolving-adapting,
through  feedback  and  continuous  change  to  a  world  filled  with  other
complex systems  with which they have  to interact.  Our social institutions,
our collective  information  flow membranes,  must be  allowed  to  evolve  to
become  as complex as necessary to permit the most valuable and interesting
society  to  emerge.  Given  what  we  know  about  complex  networks,  the
course  of  this  evolution  will  tend  towards  heterogeneity,  not
homogeneity.
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Congress  needs  to  show  leadership  at  this  moment  by  reasserting  its
hands-off, "unfettered by federal or state regulation" approach-which  is an
"evolutionary"  approach  to permeable  information flow  membranes  stated
in  legislative  language-to  the  Internet.  There  is  still  a  chance  that  if
Congress takes a cosmopolitan 225 approach to Internet governance it will be
able  to persuade  other agencies around the world to restrain  their regulatory
desires  despite the entreaties of law  enforcement,  the  content industry,  and
telecommunications  companies.  The natural state of the cosmos, and of the
Internet,  is  not  chaos.  It  is,  instead,  order,  that  comes  about  with  no
external  pilot.  But this  kind of lively, dynamic  order only emerges when  it
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is permitted  to  do so.  The  next  step  in  Internet  governance  should be  to
take the long view.Notes & Observations